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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

## CENTERS OF POWER AND "INDEPENDENT KINGDOMS" AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL IN COMMUNIST CHINA (Reference Title: POLO III-57)



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

# Centers of Power and "Independent Kingdoms" At the Regional Level in Communist China

This study is a working paper. It traces the development of centers of power in Communist China, immediately below the national level, prior to and since the threat of "independent kingdoms" in 1953. It identifies the national bodies and leaders which direct the administrations below the national level, and discusses the party's most important organs at the lower level, the regime's most important military areas, and the pattern of relationships among the key political and military figures of the current centers of power at the lower level. The study also speculates on alignments among these key figures, and finds that the party leaders in Peiping with the greatest number of apparent protegés below the national level are Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Te-huai, and Peng Chen. Finally the study examines the current status of "independent kingdoms"--centers of power below the national level which have some potential either for defiance of Peiping or for manipulation by one group of leaders in Peiping. It concludes that some areas are worth watching for possible separatist action, and that key figures in several of these areas may be responsive to individual leaders of previously conjectured groups in Peiping, notably the "organizational" group and the "military" group. (There are two graphics, one of national bodies and leaders, the other of party and military headquarters and their key figures below the national level.) As in POLO II-57, the views expressed herein are tentative, and some will no doubt be revised as further information becomes available.

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This study reflects information received through 1 November 1957, some of which was originated by BI/OLI of the Department of State, by the service intelligence agencies, and by CSS/ORR and other components of CIA.

# CENTERS OF POWER AND "INDEPENDENT KINGDOMS" AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL IN COMMUNIST CHINA

## SUMMARY



Communist China by 1951 was divided, below the national level, into six major areas of administration: the Northeast (Manchuria), the Northwest, the Southwest, East China, the Central-South, and North China. Each of these areas was ruled by a Chinese Communist party bureau, a civil government, and a military headquarters. These three administrations were interlocked, with the same few persons holding the top posts in each of the three. The four great field armies were stationed in four of the six major areas. The party leadership maintained control of these armies through political officers who "jointly" commanded them, through party committees in the military units, through local party committees of the areas in which the units were stationed, and through a secret police network. The political officer, by holding the leading positions in one or more of the organs which checked the military commander, was in most cases a stronger figure than the military commander. As of 1951, the key figures in the Northeast were Kao Kang and Li Fu-chun; in the Northwest, Peng Te-huai and Hsi Chung-hsun; in the Southwest, Teng Hsiao-ping, Liu Po-cheng, and Ho Lung; in East China, Jao Shu-shih and Chen I, along with Kang Sheng in Shantung; in Central-South China, nominally Lin Piao, actually Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Tzu-hui; and in North China, Po I-po, Nieh Jung-chen, and Liu Lan-tao.



Peiping began in 1952 to strengthen the central authority at the expense of the regional administrations. For various reasons, many key figures--party, government, and military--of the regional administrations were soon transferred to Peiping. Some of these persons, including Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, may have continued to concern themselves with their former regional administrations, but none appeared to have his previous power at the regional level. The principal figures on the spot, in the various regions, became: Lin Feng, in the Northeast; Ma Ming-fang, in the Northwest; Liu Po-cheng and Ho Lung, assisted by Sung Jen-chiung and Chang Chi-chun, in the Southwest; Tan Chen-lin,

military districts, commanded by major generals (one star), are comparatively unimportant. The party ranking of the military leaders somewhat resembles the Soviet picture, as most of the military commanders of the 14 major headquarters are either full or alternate members of the CCP central committee, while very few of the political officers (except where the military commander holds the political post concurrently) are members of the central committee. Most of the military commanders and political officers have held important posts in their present areas for some years.



The most important relationships among key figures at the regional level in Communist China appear to be (a) the relationship between the first secretary of the party committee of a given area, on one hand, and the military commander and political officer of the military headquarters located in that area, on the other, and (b) the relationship of the military commander and political officer with each other. The party committee within the military headquarters is theoretically superior to the military commander and political officer, and the local party secretary is superior to them with respect to narrowly defined party affairs. However, the party committee in the military unit is almost certainly responsive to the military commander and political officer (one or the other of whom heads the committee), and the local party secretary almost certainly cannot enforce their obedience in major questions involving the military headquarters. The relationship between the local party secretary and the military leaders appears to be one of liaison and coordination, with disputed questions referred to Peiping. With regard to the relations of military leaders with each other, the military commander and the political officer are still, unlike their Soviet counterparts, the "joint" commanders of the military formations, a situation which continues to create problems for Peiping. However, the party rank of the military commanders is now generally higher than that of the political officers, and the party committees in the military headquarters probably are now more often headed by the military commander than by the political officer. Chinese party police officials, attached to local party committees and military formations, appear to have functions of intelligence and surveillance similar to those of the Soviet government police, and to be, like them, less important figures than are party and military leaders.

The party leader in Peiping with the greatest number of apparent protegés, among key figures at the regional level at this time, is Teng Hsiao-ping of the "organizational" group. Next in importance at the regional level appears to be Peng Te-huai of the "military" group. Following Teng and Peng seems to be Peng Chen of the "organizational" group. A few possible protegés of "administrative" and "police" figures can be identified among regional leaders. Only one of the leaders of the three major "autonomous" regions can be aligned with a national leader--the principal figure in Tibet, with Teng Hsiao-ping; in each of these regions, the leaders have worked together for several years. Peng Chen appears to have protegés among the political leaders in the Northeast, and Peng Te-huai among the military leaders there and in adjacent North Korea; most of these regional figures have worked together for two or three years. In Northwest China, most of the key figures have been associated with Peng Te-huai or with protegés of Peng; most of them have worked together for at least three years. In the Southwest, most of the key figures in both centers of power--Chengtu and Kunming--have been associated with Teng Hsiao-ping, and most of them have been together for several years. In East China, the person whose influence is most apparent is not a former regional leader but the present secretary of the Shanghai (East China regional) bureau, Ko Ching-shih. In that area--a divided center of power--some of the political leaders in Shanghai, who have not long worked as a group, might be aligned with various "organizational," "administrative" and "police" leaders in Peiping; and the predominantly military leaders at Nanking, most of whom have been together for several years, might be aligned with "organizational" and "administrative" figures; but the picture is cloudy throughout East China. In Central China, (i.e., Wuhan), one or more of the key figures--who have not long been together--might be aligned with Teng Hsiao-ping. In South China, the most important official is aligned with a national leader who himself is unaligned, while one military leader there has been associated with "administrative" figures; the leaders in this area have worked together for many years. Throughout North China and in the city of Peiping, the influence of Peng Chen and Po I-po appears strong; most of the key figures have been together for several years. The Shantung area of North China, where the key figures are a comparatively new team, increasingly shows the influence of Teng Hsiao-ping, with Peng Te-huai also represented.

An "independent kingdom" has been defined as a center of power at the regional level which has some potential either for defiance of Peiping or for manipulation of one group of leaders in Peiping. There seems only a small possibility that any set of regional leaders will overtly defy Peiping, although there are some areas which appear to be worth watching. The regional administrations are more interesting at this time in terms of their value to the various conjectured groups in Peiping, in that key figures in several of these regional centers of power may be responsive to individual leaders in those groups. Of comparatively minor importance are the centers of power at Kueisui (Inner Mongolia), Urumchi (Sinkiang), Lhasa (Tibet), Wuhan (Central China), Lanchow (Northwest China), and Pyongyang (CPV headquarters in Korea). Of this lot, those in which separatist action is conceivable are Inner Mongolia, if the USSR were to attempt to draw the area away from Peiping, and Sinkiang, if the presently second-ranking Uighur leader were to replace the Han Chinese as the top man. Of this same lot, Lhasa and Wuhan may represent very minor assets for Teng Hsiao-ping, and Lanchow and Pyongyang may represent somewhat more important assets for Peng Te-huai. Of greater importance are the centers of power at Foochow (Southeast China), Chengtu and Kunming (both in Southwest China), and Tsinan (Shantung). Of these four, certain of the conditions for separatist action are present at Foochow, Chengtu, and Kunming. The more striking feature of these centers, however, is that three of the four--Chengtu, Kunming, and Tsinan--are so heavily staffed with protegés of Teng Hsiao-ping that they appear to represent substantial assets for him. Peng Te-huai's strength may be somewhat increased by protegés in two of those centers, Chengtu and Tsinan. The most important centers of power in Communist China are clearly those at Mukden (Northeast), Canton (South), Shanghai-Nanking (East) and Peiping (North). In the first three of these, particularly at Nanking, there are some considerations favoring separatist action, but for various reasons the prospect for such action is poor. The "organizational" group appears to have some strength in Mukden (through Peng Chen) and Shanghai-Nanking, the "administrative" group in Canton and Shanghai-Nanking, and the "military" group in Mukden. However, none of these three centers of power looks to be so responsive to any single group in Peiping as to be regarded as a substantial asset for that group. The Peiping regional administration is in a special position, as "separatist" action there would be a part of an attempt to seize control of the entire regime. At this time, power in the Peiping area--which would be the most valuable property of all "independent kingdoms"--appears to be divided among Peng Chen of the "organizational" group and leaders of at least one and perhaps all three of the other conjectured groups.

## Chinese Communist Regional Administrations, 1937-1951

During the wartime period 1937-1945, the Chinese Communists developed 18 "liberated areas" and border region governments, controlling more than 100,000,000 people. After 1945, with the progress of Chinese Communist armies, these various regimes were reformed into more unified regional administrations. The first of these was proclaimed in North China in 1948, becoming a model for other regional administrations and for the Peiping regime itself. Following the establishment of the Peiping regime in October 1949, the North China administration was abolished and its territory placed under the jurisdiction of the central government. A "people's government" for all of the Northeast (Manchuria) was set up in 1949, and regional administrations of a less "advanced" type appeared in 1950 in Northwest China, East China, Central-South China and Southwest China. In 1951, North China was placed under a committee somewhat similar to the "military and administrative committees" in the Northwest, East, Central-South and Southwest, although smaller and more directly responsive to the central government.

Each of the six major areas (Manchuria and the five parts of China proper) was ruled by a Chinese Communist party bureau, a civil government and a military headquarters. These three administrations were interlocked, with the same few persons holding the top posts--usually in different order of rank--in each of the three. In addition, the four field armies were stationed in four of the major areas: the 1st in the Northwest, the 2nd in the Southwest, the 3rd in East China, and the 4th in Central-South China. The party leaders in Peiping were concerned with maintaining control of the various areas through the regional administrations, and of the military organizations through party networks.

Chinese Communist armies had long been commanded "jointly" by the military commander and a political officer of equal rank; the latter officer was described by the Communists themselves as the "party's representative" in the army. By 1950 the Chinese Communists had introduced at least two other controls over the military commander; the party committee in the military unit, and the local party committee outside the military unit. (There appeared to be yet another check through the counter-intelligence section of the political departments, the personnel of which were reportedly named by and responsible directly to the social affairs department--the secret police --

of the party.) The party committee in the military unit was specified to be superior to both the military commander and the political officer as individuals, "directing all activities" of the military unit. A Chinese Communist document of the period revealed that "in general" the political officers were concurrently the secretaries (chiefs) of the party committees. Another document revealed that the party committee in the military unit was "generally" subordinate to the local party committee of the corresponding level, a committee often headed by this same political officer. Thus, as of 1951, the military commander was checked once by his political officer as political officer, usually again by the political officer wearing his hat as secretary of the party committee in the military unit, and often a third time by the political officer in his hat as secretary of the local party committee.

In 1951, the key figures in the Northeast, the most "advanced" regional administration, were Kao Kang and Li Fu-chun. The party leaders in Peiping, to their later regret, did not divide the first-ranking positions in the party, civil, and military administrations among two or more persons. Kao Kang had all four of them, as first secretary of the Northeast bureau of the party, chairman of the Northeast people's government, and commander and political officer of the Northeast military area. Li Fu-chun was Kao's deputy in the first two posts; the military posts were less important, as there was then no field army in Manchuria, and the Manchurian headquarters of Chinese forces in Korea was not commanded by Kao. In the much less important neighboring area of Inner Mongolia, the picture was similar: the Sinicized Mongol, Ulanfu, held all four of the top party, government and military posts.

Northwest China was dominated by Peng Te-huai and Hsi Chung-hsun. Until his transfer to command Chinese forces in Korea in 1951, Peng was commander of the 1st Field Army and Northwest military district, chairman of the Northwest government, and possibly first secretary of the Northwest bureau of the party; Peng was not identified as first secretary, but Hsi was identified in 1952 as being only the second secretary. Hsi, in addition to being second secretary of the Northwest bureau, was political officer of the 1st Field Army and Northwest military district. One province of the Northwest , Sinkiang, was under a party subbureau headed by Wang Chen.

The key figures in Southwest China were Teng Hsiao-ping, Liu Po-cheng and Ho Lung. Teng was first secretary of the party's Southwest bureau and political officer of the 2nd Field Army and Southwest military district. Liu was commander

of the 2nd Field Army, chairman of the Southwest government, and one of the secretaries of the Southwest bureau. Ho was commander of the Southwest military district and one of the secretaries--possibly second secretary--of the Southwest bureau.

East China was dominated by Jao Shu-shih and Chen I. Jao was first secretary of the East China bureau, chairman of the East China government, and political officer of the 3rd Field Army and East China military district. Chen was commander of the 3rd Field Army and East China military district, and second secretary of the East China bureau. One province of East China, Shantung, was under a party subbureau headed by Kang Sheng, then a full member of the CCP politburo.

The picture in the very large and populous area of Central-South China was hazy. Lin Piao was first secretary of the Central-South bureau of the party, chairman of the Central-South government, and commander of the crack 4th Field Army and of the Central-South. However, Lin may have been too ill after 1950 to discharge any of these responsibilities. The second-ranking leader in the area was Lo Jung-huan, second secretary of the Central-South bureau and political officer of the 4th Field Army and Central-South military district. However, Lo was transferred to Peiping late in 1950 and became the ranking political officer of Chinese forces in Korea in 1951. The operating authorities in the Central-South after 1950 seemed to be Yeh Chien-ying, first secretary of the South China subbureau of the party and commander and political officer of the South China military district, Teng Tzu-hui, third secretary of the Central-South bureau and deputy political officer of the 4th Field Army and Central-South military district, Li Hsien-nien, deputy commander of the 4th Field Army and a deputy secretary of the Central-South bureau, and Li Hsueh-feng, director of the bureau's organization department.

The key figures in North China were Po I-po, Nieh Jung-chen and Liu Lan-tao. While holding posts in the central government concurrently, Po was first secretary of the North China bureau of the party and political officer of the North China military district. Nieh Jung-chen, concurrently the acting chief of staff of the central government, was second secretary of the North China bureau and commander of the North China military district. Liu was third secretary of the North China bureau and chairman of the North China government.

## Changes in the Regional Administrations, 1952-1954

The party leaders in Peiping took measures in 1952 to strengthen the central authority against the possible development of unresponsive or insubordinate regional administrations. Uniform administrative committees were established in all six of the "great areas." Whereas most of the regional governments had previously been specified as both representing the central government and being the local authority of "highest level," the administrative committees of 1952 became only representative organs of the central government. In the following two years, all of the key figures--party, government and military--of the regional administrations were reassigned to posts in Peiping. Most of these assignments were promotions, but some represented a considerable loss of power. Moreover, while in many cases protegés of the regional leaders moved into the key regional posts, in no case could a regional leader of the 1949-1952 period expect to retain his previous power at the regional level after his transfer to Peiping.

Kao Kang and Li Fu-chun were pulled out of Manchuria in 1952. Kao was brought to Peiping to be chairman of the State Planning Committee (long-range planning), while Li was sent to Moscow for economic negotiations and then named as Kao's deputy on the planning body. Although Kao kept his Northeast titles until his purge in 1954, authority in the Northeast in 1953 and 1954 appeared to be largely in the hands of Lin Feng, who had ranked below Kao and Li as a secretary of the party's Northeast bureau. Ulanfu of the Inner Mongolian regime retained all of the major posts there, but began to spend much of his time in Peiping.

Peng Te-huai had been transferred from the Northwest to Korea in 1951. Hsi Chung-hsun was brought to Peiping in 1953 to be director of the party's propaganda department, but soon lost that post and was given a comparatively unimportant job as secretary general of the State Council. The top man in the Northwest became Ma Ming-fang, third secretary of the party's Northwest bureau. The military command in the area appeared to be divided among two or three less important figures, whom Peng Te-huai later brought to Peiping. The party's Sinkiang subbureau passed from Wang Chen to Wang En-mao; Wang Chen became commander of the PLA's railway engineers corps.

Teng Hsiao-ping was brought from the Southwest to Peiping in 1952 to be a vice premier and, soon, secretary general of

the party as well. Liu Po-cheng remained in the Southwest as commander of the 2nd Field Army and chairman of the Southwest government. Ho Lung was elevated to first secretary of the party's Southwest bureau, but spent much time out of the area. Of increasing importance were Sung Jen-chiung and Chang Chi-chun, deputy secretaries of the Southwest bureau and deputy political officers of the 2nd Field Army and Southwest military district.

Jao Shu-shih was pulled out of East China in 1952, and in 1953 succeeded Peng Chen in the key post of director of the party's organization department. Chen I became the principal authority in East China as the party's ranking secretary there and as commander of the 3rd Field Army and East China military district. After early 1953, however, the top man actually present in East China most of the time appeared to be Tan Chen-lin, third secretary of the East China bureau who was frequently identified as acting secretary. The Shantung subbureau remained under Kang Sheng.

Lin Piao retained his titles in the Central-South until 1954, but throughout 1952 and 1953 he was apparently confined to a sanitarium. Yeh Chien-ying of the South China subbureau was identified in the 1952-1954 period as acting secretary of the party's Central-South bureau and acting commander of the 4th Field Army and Central-South military district. Yeh's authority was shared for a time with Teng Tzu-hui, promoted to second secretary of the Central-South bureau and apparently acting political officer of the 4th Field Army and Central-South military district, but in 1953 Teng was brought to Peiping to be director of the party's important rural work department. From early 1953, Tan Cheng became Yeh's principal lieutenant as a secretary of the Central-South bureau and political officer of the 4th Field Army and Central-South military district. Li Hsien-nien and Li Hsueh-feng occupied important military, political and economic posts. The operation of the party's South China subbureau apparently was in the hands of Tao Chu.

The key figures of the North China administration did not need to be brought to Peiping; they were already there. Po I-po, Nieh Jung-chen and Liu Lan-tao retained the principal party, military and government posts of the area until 1954, while concurrently occupying important posts in the central government.

## Abolition of the Regional Administrations, 1954-1955

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Toward the end of 1953 the Chinese Communist leadership apparently began to be concerned about factionalism in the party and the related problem of "independent kingdoms."

[redacted]

Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, once the dominant figures in Northeast China and East China who had been given key posts in Peiping in 1952, disappeared from the news after January 1954, at which time Kao was the fourth ranking leader in the party hierarchy. In April 1955, Kao and Jao were said by Peiping to have been the leaders of an "antiparty conspiracy." According to Peiping's generally plausible account of the matter, Kao and Jao, suffering from hubris, had plotted in effect to depose Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai as Mao's two top lieutenants and to rearrange the rest of the party hierarchy to make it responsive to them. They were said to have sought support from military leaders.

In the light of the past regional power and more recent central positions of Kao and Jao, the powerful regional administrations then existing throughout Communist China presented the party leaders in Peiping with a double threat. The two or three key figures of any given area might make common cause against the central leadership as a whole. (Kao was indeed accused in 1955 of having tried to operate Manchuria as an "independent kingdom"--a late discovery, in view of his 1952-53 posts in Peiping and the references to him in 1953 as one of Mao's "close comrades.") Alternatively, the handful of key figures in an area might be responsive as a group to one or two individuals in key posts in Peiping, and thus might be manipulated by one faction in Peiping against other factions or all the rest of the central leadership. (Both Kao and Jao had left protegés in their regional administrations, and Jao, as director of the party's organization department, was in a choice position to pack the regional administrations throughout China with other followers.) The problem of potentially

defiant or manipulatable regional administrations seemed to be particularly serious in the four areas of China in which the large and powerful field armies were stationed. Any one of those armies could put up a respectable battle against the others, perhaps requiring the commitment of such strong forces from other areas of China that the central government, resting primarily on armed force, could not maintain its control over those areas. Moreover, the troops in those field armies may have been personally loyal to their long-time commanders, and certain of those commanders (e.g., Liu Po-cheng) appeared to have something less than the full confidence of Mao Tse-tung.

Later in 1954, the Chinese Communist leadership decided that the best solution to the problem of potentially dangerous regional administrations was to destroy them. By the end of 1954, all of the party's regional bureaus and regional governments either had been abolished or were terminating their operations, and the four field armies had been abolished. The top-level regional leaders, both political and military, who had not previously been brought to Peiping were reassigned to Peiping during 1954 and 1955.

Lin Feng, the ranking figure in the Northeast after 1952, in November 1954 was named director of the State Council's second staff office, coordinating the work of ministries concerned with education, culture and health. Ulanfu remained the key figure in Inner Mongolia--the equivalent of a provincial regime--but was named vice premier in 1954 and has reportedly spent most of his time since then in Peiping.

Ma Ming-fang, the ranking figure in the Northwest, was brought to Peiping in late 1954 or early 1955 to be a deputy secretary general of the central committee and a deputy director of the party's organization department. Wang En-mao of the Sinkiang administration--like Inner Mongolia, the equivalent of a provincial regime--remained there.

Liu Po-cheng, Ho Lung, Sung Jen-chiung and Chang Chi-chun, the major figures in the Southwest after 1952, were all brought to Peiping in 1954. Liu became director of the PLA's training department. Sung Jen-chiung became a deputy secretary general of the central committee. Chang Chi-chun became a deputy director of the party's propaganda department.

Chen I of the East China administration came to Peiping in 1954 to be named a vice premier. Tan Chen-lin was brought to Peiping in 1955 and became a deputy secretary general of the central committee. Kang Sheng of the Shantung subbureau

of the party, the only politburo member in a regional post, came to Peiping in 1954 to take up some undisclosed work.

Lin Piao, nominally the dominant figure in Central-South China, was named vice premier in 1954 and elected to the party politburo, but apparently remained in an East China sanitarium (suffering from tuberculosis and possibly a psychosis). Yeh Chien-ying came to Peiping in 1954 as director of the PLA's supervision department. Tan Cheng became a deputy minister of defense. Li Hsien-nien became a vice premier, minister of finance, and director of a major staff office coordinating financial and commercial work. Li Hsueh-feng became director of the party's important industrial work department. Tao Chu, acting secretary to the party's South China subbureau in 1953-54, was not brought to Peiping, but became first secretary of the Kwangtung provincial committee when the subbureau was abolished.

The key figures of the North China administration, as previously noted, were in Peiping when the regional administrations were abolished in 1954. Po I-po continued to rise, becoming in 1954 director of the State Council's staff office coordinating the work of ministries concerned with heavy industry. Nieh Jung-chen may have lost his military and his political posts in the North China administration during 1954, and may also have been relieved as deputy chief-of-staff at that time. Liu Lan-tao became a deputy secretary-general of the party.

## The Current Composition of the Central Organs

In recent years there may have been many changes in those central organs of the party and state, including the military establishment, which are of greatest importance in the structure of power at the national level and are also of greatest importance from the perspective of the key figures at the regional level. The strength of the various central groups conjectured in POLO II-57--the "organizational," "administrative," "military," and "police"--derives primarily from positions in these organs at the core of power. Party leaders in these organs in addition to their functions at the national level, appoint and direct key figures at the regional level, and may reward or punish, protect or abandon them.

The key organs of the party are the politburo, the politburo standing committee, the secretariat, the organization department, the general political department (a party organ functioning in the Ministry of National Defense), and probably the social affairs

and propaganda departments. The key organs of the government are the State Council and some of its staff offices, and the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff. The most important positions in all of these key organs are divided among party leaders who have been in Yenan and Peiping for many years and others who have been leaders at the regional level for varying periods since World War II.

The party politburo exercises the authority of the central committee between plenary sessions in directing "all the work of the party." The politburo as a body does not appear to be as important as its standing committee, and it is doubtful that the politburo concerns itself with the routine of either policies or appointments at the regional level. Nevertheless, a friend on the politburo might be a great asset to a regional leader. Of the 17 members and alternate members of the politburo still regarded as being major figures, ten have been regional leaders since World War II. These are in order of rank: Teng Hsiao-ping (from the Southwest,, concurrently a member of the politburo standing committee, secretary general and head of the secretariat, and a vice premier; Peng Chen (from the Northeast), concurrently second-ranking member of the secretariat, first secretary of the Peiping municipal committee, and senior vice chairman of the NPC standing committee; Lo Jung-huan (from the Central-South), with no other known party post, but a vice chairman of the NPC standing committee; Chen I (from East China), with no other known party post, but a vice premier; Li Fu-chun (from the Northeast), concurrently a vice premier and chairman of the State Planning Commission (five-year plans); Peng Te-huai (from the Northwest), concurrently a vice premier and minister of national defense, the most important military post in the regime; Li Hsien-nien (from the Central South), concurrently a vice premier director of the State Council's important fifth staff office, and minister of finance; Ulanfu, still the top man in Inner Mongolia; Kang Sheng (from Shantung), demoted to alternate member in 1956 but possibly still with a key post in the party police or another major department; and Po I-po (from North China), concurrently a vice premier, director of the most important staff office (the third) of the State Council, and director of the National Economic Commission (annual planning). Three of the six politburo members regarded as no longer being major figures have also been regional leaders; Liu Po-cheng and Ho Lung, from the Southwest, and the ailing Lin Piao, from the Central-South.

The politburo's standing committee, which is apparently to constitute the center of a "collective leadership" when

Mao Tse-tung leaves the scene, seems to be the core of party power, in that it acts for the politburo between its meetings. The standing committee may pass on all key appointments at the regional level. Four of its members--Mao, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yun--have seemed for many years to be the four most important leaders of the party. One member, Chu Te, appears unimportant. The sixth member, added only in 1956 to the top few, and the only regional leader of recent years among these six, is Teng Hsiao-ping. Teng rose spectacularly after coming to Peiping in 1952, soon becoming Liu Shao-chi's first deputy for party affairs (with Liu himself remaining Mao Tse-tung's first lieutenant for party affairs), a member of the politburo, and, with his concurrent posts since 1956 on the standing committee and secretariat, the fifth-ranking or possibly fourth-ranking figure in the party.

The standing committee directs the work of the party secretariat, responsible under the party constitution for handling the daily work of the central committee. The secretariat directs the work of the central committee's departments and of the party's major committees below the national level, and probably plays the largest role in naming the secretaries of those committees. From the perspective of these party secretaries, the secretariat would appear to be much the most important organ of the party. It would presumably seem almost that important to the political officers of the major military headquarters as well (as it directs the General Political Department), and it would have considerable importance for the military commanders. Of the ten members of the present secretariat, seven have been regional leaders in recent years. The two ranking members of the secretariat are the party's secretary general, Teng Hsiao-ping (also a member of the politburo and its standing committee), who came from the Southwest, and Peng Chen, a politburo member and the party leader in the Northeast after World War II, preceding Kao Kang). It was speculated in POLO II-57 that Teng and Peng, together with the party's second-ranking figure, Liu Shao-chi, represent the core of an "organizational" group at the center of the structure of power in Communist China. That still seems a reasonable conjecture. However, the possibility is not excluded that Peng bears some resentment against either Liu or Teng or both, as a result of Teng displacing him as Liu's first lieutenant for party affairs. (The Kao-Jao case may well have been responsible for Peng's slight decline in the hierarchy. Kao succeeded Peng as party chief in the Northeast, and Jao succeeded Peng as director of the party's organization department; Peng probably played an important part in selecting both of them.)

The five other full members of the secretariat, in order of rank, are: Wang Chia-hsiang, never a regional leader, now deputy foreign minister, aligned with the conjectured "administrative" group around Chou En-lai; Tan Chen-lin, until 1955 a party secretary and political officer in East China, who perhaps has another key post in one of the major departments, and who is aligned with the "organizational" group; Tan Cheng, a leader in the Central-South area in the period 1949-54, now concurrently the senior deputy minister of defense and director of the party's (and ministry's) general political department, who throughout his career has seemed to be a protegé of Mao Tse-tung, and who, after Mao, is aligned with the "organizational" group; Huang Ko-cheng, another leader from the Central-South, now concurrently a deputy minister of defense (and primarily a military man), who has long been associated with Peng Te-huai and may be one of Peng's protégés; and Li Hsueh-feng, yet another leader from the Central-South, now concurrently director of the party's industrial work department, who has been associated at both the national and regional levels with Tan Cheng but who cannot plausibly be aligned. The three alternate members of the secretariat are: Liu Lan-tao, long a party leader in North China, now concurrently the senior deputy on the party's control commission (which examines violations of the party constitution and party discipline), aligned with the "organizational" group; Yang Shang-kun, never a regional leader, now concurrently director of the central committee's general office, and also aligned with the "organization" group; and Hu Chiao-mu, never a regional leader, long a spokesman for Mao Tse-tung and clearly Mao's protegé.

The party's organization department was believed prior to the fall of Jao Shu-shih, to control the assignments of all party personnel below the top level. The party secretariat may well have taken over part of the work previously handled by the organization department, and almost certainly plays a more important role than the organization department in selecting the first secretaries of major party committees. However, the organization department may still make recommendations as to candidates for first secretaryships, and probably nominates some of the lesser secretaries and heads of departments, some of whom will later be the first secretaries. Of the five leading suspects as the current director of the organization department (unidentified since 1953), four have been regional leaders in recent years. These are Teng Hsiao-ping (Southwest), Peng Chen (Northeast), Tan Chen-lin (East China), all of the party secretariat, and Ma Ming-fang (Northwest), one of the two persons identified in the past two years as deputy directors of

this department. The other known deputy is An Tzu-wen, not known ever to have been a regional leader. Another possible deputy, judging from his recent activities, is Kang Sheng (once the party chief in Shantung). All of these persons except the last-named have been speculatively aligned with the "organizational" group.

The party's social affairs department is believed still to be responsible for surveillance of party officials and military personnel on the regional as well as national level. Subject to confirmation by the party secretariat, the social affairs department probably nominates the heads of social affairs departments of major party committees and the heads of political security (counterintelligence) sections of political departments of major military headquarters. The director of the social affairs department has been unidentified since 1949. The post may currently be held by Kang Sheng, once of the Shantung subbureau. Another suspect is Li Ko-nung, who is probably concerned with security affairs as a deputy chief of staff, and who has never been a regional leader. A third suspect, if he is not holding the post of director of the organization department, is Tan Chen-lin, who was engaged in police work for Mao early in his career. It has been thought that the party secretariat would want to have one of its members in the social affairs department, as a deputy director if not as director, in order to keep a close watch on it, and Tan is the only member of the secretariat who seems to have the right background. Kang and Li have been regarded as belonging with the conjectured "police" group, while Tan, as noted above, is aligned with the "organizational" group.

The propaganda department directs the party's work in the field of information, indoctrination, education and culture, presumably nominates the heads of propaganda departments of the major committees and of propaganda sections of political departments of major military headquarters. None of the three ranking figures in this department, director Lu Ting-i and deputies Chen Po-ta and Hu Chiao-mu, has been a regional leader, and all three are protegés of Mao who can be aligned only with him. Another deputy, Chou Yang, has had posts only at the center and cannot be aligned with anyone. The two other known deputies, Chang Chi-chun and Chang Tzu-i, both named since 1954, both came from the Southwest, where they were lieutenants of Teng Hsiao-ping, they are thus tentatively aligned, through Teng, with the "organizational" group.

The State Council, the "highest administrative organ of the state," is regarded as less important than the party organs

which originate both the policies which it implements and the appointments to its key positions. From the point of view of most of the key figures below the national level, the State Council would seem of small concern. The party secretaries, of course, are not responsible in any sense to the State Council, which is entirely a government organ. The political officers and party police representatives in military units have only a nominal relationship with the State Council, in that their offices--which are party organs--are administratively subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense, in turn subordinate to the State Council. Of the key figures at the regional level, the military commanders might be genuinely concerned with the State Council, in that it has authority to annul orders of the defense minister, to appoint or dismiss officers of the level of division commander and above, and to pass on promotions through the rank of colonel general. However, just as the party secretaries at the regional level would seem more concerned with the party secretariat than with the party politburo as a whole, the military commanders would seem more concerned with the Ministry of National Defense to which they are directly responsible than with the State Council to which the ministry is responsible. Perhaps it can be said that a friend among the leaders of the State Council would be useful to a regional figure, although not so useful--in terms of position--as a friend in the Ministry of National Defense or its General Staff. Chou En-lai, the premier, is regarded as the central figure of an "administrative" group in the Chinese Communist leadership. Eleven of Chou's 12 vice premiers are onetime regional leaders. Nine of these are politburo members discussed previously: Teng Hsiao-ping (Southwest), an "organizational" figure; Lin Piao (Central-South), unaligned and inactive; Chen I (East China), "administrative"; Li Fu-chun (Northeast), "administrative"; Peng Te-huai (Northwest), "military"; Ho Lung (Southwest), unaligned and apparently unimportant; Li Hsien-nien (Central-South), unaligned; Ulanfu (Inner Mongolia), unaligned; and Po I-po (North China), unaligned. The two vice premiers who are onetime regional leaders but are not politburo members are: Teng Tzu-hui (Central-South), concurrently director of the party's rural work department and of the State Council's seventh staff office, who was held in part responsible for "rightist conservatism" in the agricultural field prior to mid-1955 but who may now be repairing his fortunes, and who cannot be aligned; and Nieh Jung-chen (North China), concurrently the chairman (probably nominal) of the Scientific Planning Commission, regarded as an unimportant "administrative" figure. The State Council's secretary general, Hsi Chung-hsun, is a onetime leader in the Northwest who was apparently a failure in his brief tour as director of the party's propaganda department, who is unaligned.

The minister of national defense is believed to have authority over all military activities, including operations, of all arms of the service; and to play the largest role in selecting military leaders at both the national and regional levels. Defense Minister Peng Te-huai, the ranking military and political leader in the Northwest in the period 1947-51, can be aligned only with Mao Tse-tung. Peng, the only one of the oldtime military leaders known to be still active in the military establishment, has appeared to be surrounding himself with his protegés and with former lieutenants of Lin Piao, who was once perhaps the most able Chinese Communist field commander but who has been ill and has made very few and brief appearances in recent years. Peng is regarded as the central figure in a "military" group in the Chinese Communist leadership. Peng's deputy ministers of defense, in order of rank, are: Tan Cheng, once of the Central South (Lin Piao's area), concurrently director of the general political department and member of the party secretariat (see above and below), an "organizational" figure; Huang Ko-cheng, also from the Central-South, also concurrently a member of the secretariat (see above), possibly a protege of Peng Te-huai; Hsiao Ching-kuang, after World War II the deputy commander of the forces in Manchuria which moved to the Central-South, since 1950 commander of the navy, who cannot be aligned; Wang Shu-sheng, yet another figure from the Central-South command, last identified as the military commander of the Tsinan headquarters, who likewise cannot be aligned; Hsiao Ko, onetime chief of staff of the Central-South area, who cannot be aligned; Liao Han-sheng, once a political officer under Peng Te-huai in the Northwest and probably a Peng protegé; and Li Ta, once of the Southwest, then Peng's chief of staff in Korea, probably also a Peng protegé. (Chen Keng was identified in POLO II-57 as a possible deputy minister of defense; he is no longer so regarded).

The General Staff, subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, is the executive, coordinating, and planning organ of that ministry. Most of the orders received by the military commanders of major military headquarters probably come through the General Staff, with operational orders generally originating there; and the General Staff probably nominates some of the regional military leaders. The chief of staff is Su Yu, once of the East China command; Su, regarded like Peng Te-huai and Lin Piao, as an outstanding officer, cannot be aligned with any group. Su's deputies, in order of rank, are: Chen Keng, once of the Southwest, then Peng's deputy commander in Korea, aligned with the "military" group; Li Ko-nung, never a regional leader, onetime director of the party's social affairs department and probably concerned with police work in the military establishment in his current post--who may name the leading counterintelligence personnel in the armed forces and who is regarded as a "police"

figure; Chang Tsung-hsun, long Peng Te-huai's deputy in the Northwest, and aligned with Peng; and Chang Ai-ping, long a military leader in East China and possibly Su Yu's protegé. (POLO II-57 spoke of Wang Chen and Peng Shao-hui also as deputy chiefs of staff; that is believed to have been in error).

The General Political Department, an organ of the party's central committee and responsible for "organizational and ideological work" in the armed forces, directs the work of the political officers and probably names them, subject to confirmation by the party secretariat. The department's director, Tan Cheng, a Central-South political leader, was named a deputy minister of defense and deputy director of the political department in 1954, and in 1956 succeeded Lo Jung-huan as director of that department and was named also to the party secretariat under Teng Hsiao-ping. Tan, an apparent protegé of Mao Tse-tung, is aligned secondarily with the "organizational" group; in this connection, his work was recently praised by Teng Hsiao-ping. Tan's two known deputies are: Hsiao Hua, once briefly a military and political leader in the Northeast, who cannot be aligned with anyone except Mao Tse-tung; and Kan Szu-chi, who was with Peng Te-huai in the Northwest and in Korea but who has been associated with leaders of other conjectured groups as well and cannot be aligned with any one of them. (POLO II-57 identified Kan as Tan's senior deputy in the political department; but Peiping has been naming Hsiao Hua ahead of Kan.)

There are only a few regional leaders of the old days who have not been discussed above under one or another of the key central organs. These are: Lin Feng of the Northeast, who has remained the director of the State Council's second staff office, coordinating cultural and educational work, who has been out of the news for several months and may conceivably have got into trouble during the "hundred flowers" campaign; Liu Po-cheng of the Southwest, replaced as director of the armed forces training department, elevated to the politburo in 1956 but for some years now in Nanking as the head of a military academy; Sung Jen-chiung of the Southwest, who does not hold any known party post but is head of the Third Ministry of Machine Building, with apparently important responsibilities relating to national defense; and Yeh Chien-ying of the Central-South area, who seems, for obscure reasons, to be no longer a major figure.

## Current Regional, Provincial and Other Party Organs

The Chinese Communist party (CCP) is now organized at the regional level into 22 provincial committees, three "autonomous" area committees, and three major municipal committees. These committees are the highest regularly constituted bodies of the party below the national level, ranking immediately below the central committee in Peiping. In addition, the party has established a regional bureau in Shanghai with apparent jurisdiction--in economic matters at least--over several East China provinces and the city of Shanghai.

Party regional organs are, of course, responsible to the party central committee. In practice, as noted above, they are responsible to the politburo's standing committee, and, more directly, to the party secretariat and the party's major departments, notably the organization department, the social affairs (police) department, and the propaganda department. In the USSR, the Soviet party's republic, krai and oblast committees are similarly responsible to the CPSU central committee's presidium and secretariat and its apparatus. The CCP constitution states that: "Party organizations at the lower levels must submit work reports at fixed intervals to the party organizations at the upper level. Any problem that arises in the course of the work of the party organizations at the lower levels shall...be referred to the upper levels for instruction."

Each provincial, "autonomous" and major municipal committee of the CCP, which has been elected for a term of three years by a party congress, elects in turn a standing committee and a secretariat. In the USSR, party congresses in 14 of the 15 union republics formally elect central committees which elect bureaus and secretaries. The largest republic, the RSFSR, does not have a republic party organization; an equivalent is the CPSU central committee's bureau for the RSFSR, created in 1956 and headed by Khrushchev.

In Communist China as in the USSR, it is the secretaries who hold the greatest power at this level of administration. In the USSR the first secretaries of republic or oblast committees, though formally "elected" by the republic or oblast committees, are in fact named by Moscow. In China, the first secretaries at this level must be "approved"--and are almost certainly named--by Peiping. In the USSR, all of the first secretaries of republic or krai committees are full or alternate members of the CPSU central committee, as are most of the oblast first secretaries, particularly in the RSFSR. In Communist China, of the

28 first secretaries of this level, two are members of the CCP politburo (Peng Chen of the Peiping committee and Ulanfu of the Inner Mongolian committee), eight are full members of the central committee, and nine are alternate members of the central committee. A tenth alternate member was recently dismissed from his post as first secretary of a province; his replacement may also be an alternate member.

The CCP constitution specifies that these committees are to "lead the various kinds of work of a local nature." This means that they direct and supervise the work of the civil government at this level. This resembles the Soviet picture, where the secretaries of the republic, krai and oblast party committees have much greater power than the leaders of the civil administrations of the corresponding levels, i.e., the chairmen of the republic councils of ministers or krai and oblast Soviet executive committees. In Communist China, in the great majority of cases, the secretaries of provincial and major municipal committees concurrently head the civil administrations. Of the 28 civil administrations at this level, only three or four (Yunnan is uncertain) are not headed by either the first secretary or one of the other secretaries of the party committee of the corresponding level. Soviet secretaries do not concurrently head the civil administrations.

All three Manchurian provinces of Liaoning, Heilungkiang and Kirin have first secretaries who are full or alternate members of the CCP central committee. First secretary Huang Ou-tung in Liaoning is a former secretary in the municipal party organ in Mukden, the capital of Liaoning. One of his deputies may also be an alternate member of the central committee. Ouyang Chin, the first secretary in Heilungkiang, is a full member of the CCP central committee and is the highest ranking party official known to be in Manchuria. Ouyang moved to Heilungkiang from Port Arthur in 1954. He may have been assigned to Heilungkiang, which shares a long border with the Soviet Union, because of his experience in dealing with the Russians in Port Arthur. His chief deputy, alternate member Han Kuang, also came from Port Arthur and presumably shares Ouyang's ability to work with Soviet officials. First secretary Wu Te in Kirin is a former Tientsin official who took over party affairs in Kirin in the wake of the Kao Kang purge.

The central party organs and the Peiping municipal committee overshadow provincial party organs in North China. Peng Chen, member of both the central committee's politburo and secretariat and possibly again the head of the party's

organization department, has been the first secretary in Peiping since 1949 as well as mayor since 1951. His chief lieutenant in recent years, Liu Jen, is an alternate member of the central committee. The first secretary in Tientsin, Huang Huo-ching, an alternate member of the central committee, has been the top man in that city since 1953. First secretary Lin Tieh in Hopei has been the ranking party official in that province since 1949. He is a full member of the central committee and governor of the province. The Shansi provincial committee, headed by Tao Lu-chia, who has been working in Shansi since the 1940's, has no secretaries who are members of the central committee.

Shanghai may dominate the whole East China area much as Peiping dominates North China. Aside from Chen I, a politburo member who is nominally mayor of Shanghai but who is rarely there, Ko Ching-shih, the secretary of the Shanghai bureau and concurrently the first secretary of the Shanghai municipal committee, is the leading party official in East China. Ko, a full member of the central committee, held posts at the party center before the conquest of East China, where he has been active in Nanking and Kiangsu ever since.

The Shanghai bureau which Ko heads is the only known regional bureau of the Chinese party. The CCP constitution provides that the central committee may, "when deemed necessary," establish "central bureaus as its representative organizations," each having jurisdiction over several provinces and/or "autonomous" areas and/or municipalities. This apparently refers to regional bureaus of the same type as those abolished in 1954. The Shanghai bureau first appeared in 1955, apparently with jurisdiction over Shanghai and the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang. There has recently been an indication that this area of jurisdiction has been expanded. A Peiping broadcast of July 1957 stated that the Shanghai bureau had presided over a conference on economic cooperation by the provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Fukien and Kiangsi and the city of Shanghai, and that the East China economic cooperation committee set up by the conference would function under the Shanghai bureau. (This area is much the same as the area of jurisdiction of the old East China bureau; Shantung has been subtracted, and Kiangsi added.) However, the Shanghai bureau's authority over this area may be confined to economic matters.

Ko Ching-shih is the only party official identified with this bureau to date. Ko's chief assistant on the Shanghai municipal committee is Chen Pei-hsien, an alternate member of the central committee who has worked in Kiangsu for more than ten years. The first secretary of Kiangsu, Chiang Wei-ching,

is an alternate member of the central committee as is Chiang Hua, the first secretary in Chekiang Province. First secretary Tseng Hsi-sheng in Anhwei is a full member of the central committee. All three of these officials have been active in their respective provinces since the late 1940's.

Fukien and Kiangsi Provinces may now be subordinate to the Shanghai bureau in some party matters. Yeh Fei, the first secretary in Fukien, is an alternate member of the central committee who has held all top jobs in the province. Shao Shih-ping, one of several secretaries in Kiangsi, and long a party leader there, is an alternate member of the central committee. He apparently ranks the first secretary in Kiangsi, Yang Shang-kuei, who has also been there for years but is not a member of the central committee.

Prior to 1954, Shantung Province, though subordinate to East China in military and civil affairs, had a special status in party matters because of the existence of Shantung subbureau. This party organ was apparently subordinate to the East China bureau in some matters and directly responsible to Peiping in others. Today Shantung has no known party, military or civil connections with East China. Its party committee is one of China's strongest, in that its first secretary is a full member of the central committee and two of his deputies are alternate members.

All of these top party officials were brought into Shantung from outside the province in 1955, presumably as a result of the Kao-Jao purge which dragged down the second secretary of the old subbureau. Shu Tung, the first secretary of the present provincial committee, is a long-time political officer and propaganda specialist from the old East China bureau. His first deputy, Tan Chi-lung, was the leading party official in Chekiang Province before he moved to Shantung. Chao Chien-min, the other leading deputy, was a government official in Peiping before he was brought to Shantung to be governor and party secretary.

The Kwangtung committee, like the one in Shantung, is an outstanding provincial organ of the party, having four secretaries who are full or alternate members of the central committee. Unlike the situation in Shantung, however, these four top secretaries were all leading officials in the old South China subbureau, which the Kwangtung committee replaced. Tao Chu, the present first secretary of the Kwangtung provincial committee, was acting secretary of the old South China subbureau.

He is a full member of the CCP central committee. Ku Ta-tsun, an alternate member of the central committee, was first deputy secretary of the old subbureau. Ou Meng-chueh, also a central committee alternate member, was deputy director of the subbureau's organization department and possibly secretary of women's work in that party organ. Li Chien-chen, another female alternate member of the central committee, has not positively been identified with the subbureau, but was active in Central-South China and Kwangtung and probably was in the subbureau's rural work department.

The Kwangsi provincial party committee had two alternate members of the central committee as its leading secretaries until first secretary Chen Man-yuan was dismissed from his party posts this summer [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Wei Kuo-ching, the other alternate member of the central committee in Kwangsi, is of Chuang descent. He may have succeeded Chen as first secretary, especially as Kwangsi is now an ethnic minority area for the Chuang people. None of the secretaries of the Hunan provincial committee--headed by Chou Hsiao-chou, who has worked there at least since 1950--is a member of the central committee. 25X1

The Szechwan provincial committee is also an unusually strong party organ, in that its first secretary is a full member of the central committee, and two of his deputies are alternate members. Li Ching-chuan, the first secretary, moved into the Southwest with Liu Po-cheng's forces in 1950, and has worked there ever since. Li Ta-chang appears to share Li Ching-chuan's authority, having succeeded him as governor in addition to being his leading deputy in the party organ. Yen Hung-yen, another secretary who is an alternate member of the central committee, has a long career as a military commander and political officer. None of the secretaries of the Kweichow committee--headed by Chou Lin, who has been there since 1951--is a member of the central committee.

The Yunnan provincial committee is headed by Hsieh Fu-chih, a full member of the party's central committee. Hsieh was formerly party secretary in Chungking and political officer in the old Southwest China military district. He was first identified in Yunnan in 1953 and now holds all top jobs there, including that of commander of PLA forces stationed in the province.

The central Chinese provinces of Hupei and Honan are represented in the central committee by Pan Fu-sheng and Wu Chih-pu, both from Honan. Pan, an alternate member, may be first secretary,

but, if so, is ranked by Wu Chih-pu, who is a full member of the central committee. They have been active in this area of China since the late 1940's. The Hupei committee is headed by Wang Jen-chung, who has been there since 1949.

China's vast Northwest has only one provincial secretary who is a member of the central committee. Chang Te-sheng, an alternate member who is first secretary of Shensi Province, moved to that area from Kansu in 1955. He has been active in the Northwest since 1949. The Kansu committee is headed by Chang Chung-liang, who transferred there in 1954 after five years as first secretary in Tsinghai. The Tsinghai committee has been headed since 1954 by Kao Feng, a little-known figure.

The three "autonomous" areas of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet have party officials who are members or alternate members of the central committee. Ulanfu, the top man in Inner Mongolia since 1947, is a member of the party politburo, and is second only to Peng Chen as the ranking regional party official. Ulanfu's deputy, Kuei Pi, an alternate member of the central committee, is a leading Mongol Communist long associated with Ulanfu.

Wang En-mao, for some years the first secretary, commander and political officer in Sinkiang, is an alternate member of the central committee. His deputy secretary and deputy military commander, the Uighur Saifudin, has spent almost all of his career in Sinkiang. Saifudin, who is also governor of Sinkiang, is an alternate member of the central committee. The leading party and civil official in Tibet since 1951, Chang Ching-wu, is an alternate member of the central committee. Chang spends so much time in Peiping, where he is director of Mao Tse-tung's secretariat, that day-to-day operations in Tibet are in the hands of Chang Kuo-hua, the military commander there since 1951, who is not a member of the central committee.

## Chinese Communist Military Headquarters

The reorganization of Communist China's regional military areas, begun in 1954, has brought Peiping to a point somewhere between its old system and the current Soviet system. The Chinese since 1954 have increased the number of their military areas, thus reducing the territory of most of the commands. Like the Soviet military areas, most of the Chinese military areas are no longer coterminous with the areas of jurisdiction of party committees and civil administrations. Like some of the Soviet military areas with respect to the union republic, most of the Chinese military areas include a number of provinces,

but, unlike some of the Soviet areas, none of the Chinese areas is known to cut across the boundaries of provinces or to occupy only a part of a province. Unlike the Soviet system, the Chinese have provincial military districts in addition to major military areas.

The Chinese Communist press and radio has indicated that ten major regional headquarters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are located at Peiping, Mukden, Tsinan, Nanking, Foochow, Canton, Wuhan, Lanchow, Chengtu and Kunming. These headquarters are all commanded by officers of the rank of colonel general (three stars) or higher. Somewhat lower-level regional commands, headed by lieutenant generals (two stars), have been established in the three "autonomous" areas of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet.

Provincial military districts, under the new system, are commanded by major generals (one star) and are clearly less important than the above 13 PLA headquarters commands. The provincial military districts appear to be confined to recruiting and perhaps training, providing logistical support and maintaining the militia, and do not appear to have tactical control of PLA forces.

The Peiping headquarters of the PLA is commanded by Colonel General Yang Cheng-wu, who is also commander of the PLA's Air Defense Forces. Yang has been an active military leader in North China since the early 1940's and as first secretary of the party committee in the Peiping headquarters is clearly the most important leader in that command. His political officer, Colonel General Chu Liang-tsai, has a long record of political work in North China military organizations.

Both officers held similar jobs in the Peiping-Tientsin Garrison, which the Peiping headquarters apparently absorbed. A garrison at Tientsin under the command of a major general is still reported in the Communist press. Hopei and Shansi Provinces are believed to be subordinate to the Peiping headquarters, as they were to the old North China military command.

The jurisdiction of the Mukden headquarters is approximately the same as that of the former Northeast China military district: the Manchurian provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. Its commander, Colonel General Teng Hua, served in Korea for three years as deputy commander and then commander of Chinese "volunteers" before assuming his present post. Colonel General Chou Huan, the political officer at the Mukden headquarters, has worked as a political commissioner in Manchuria since at least 1950, surviving the Kao Kang purge of 1954-55.

Chinese troops in Korea--the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV)--are commanded by Yang Yung and have Li Chih-min as their political officer. Both are alternate members of the CCP's central committee and both rose in Korea under Peng Te-huai to their present top jobs. The CPV is roughly equivalent in type of organization to Soviet Group-of-Forces in Germany and the satellites, and is controlled from Peiping rather than from the adjacent Mukden headquarters.

A new regional military headquarters has apparently been established at Tsinan, the capital of Shantung Province. This headquarters would seem to control only Shantung Province, since the important neighboring provinces of Hopei and Kiangsu contain, respectively, the PLA headquarters at Peiping and Nanking. It is possible, however, that Tsinan has jurisdiction over all of North China and that the headquarters at Peiping is only a special garrison command.

Shantung has always held a special position among Chinese provinces under the Communists. Its party organization used to be a subbureau when other provinces had only lower level committees, and it now has three provincial party secretaries who are members of the CCP central committee when most provinces have only one or none. Shantung has the largest known party membership of any province (more than one million) and a large population of about 50 million. It is strategically located on the east coast between Peiping and Shanghai.

The party leadership in Peiping may have been having some trouble with its military leaders in the Tsinan headquarters. In early July, General Wang Shu-sheng, a deputy minister of defense, was identified in one Chinese Communist broadcast as attached to the Tsinan command; he is the only person of such importance at the national level to be identified in a regional command, and he may be a senior (four-star) general who ranks all other regional commanders. Later in July there suddenly emerged as one of the "leading personnel of PLA units in Shantung" one Wang Hsin-ting, who had long been a political officer in the Southwest under Teng Hsiao-ping. While neither the exact positions nor the dates of transfer of these two officers were given, it is possible that the party leadership in Peiping had moved rapidly to install two unusually strong figures as military commander and political officer in the Tsinan headquarters.

The old East China military district--minus Shantung--has apparently been divided into two separate areas with headquarters at Nanking and Foochow. Nanking probably has jurisdiction over

Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei Provinces. The headquarters is commanded by Colonel General Hsu Shih-yu, who served under Chen I in East China following many years of guerrilla activity in the area. The political officer, Colonel General Tang Liang, likewise served in the old East China military district as a political officer.

Two unusual situations exist in the Nanking headquarters command, involving the Shanghai garrison and the "Chekiang Front." The Shanghai garrison is commanded by a lieutenant general, thus putting it a cut above provincial military districts. It is not clear whether this command is subordinate to Nanking or to central military headquarters in Peiping. The only known regional bureau of the CCP is located in Shanghai, which is one of three cities (Peiping and Tientsin are the other two) directly subordinate to the central government.

Like the Shanghai garrison and unlike most other provinces, the Chekiang military district is commanded by a lieutenant general rather than by a major general. The Chekiang commander may owe his higher rank to the earlier existence of a "Chekiang Front" command in the province. This command was presumably abolished early in 1955 when military operations off the Chekiang coast ended. Peiping no longer refers to this command.

The Foochow headquarters is believed to have control over Fukien Province and possibly over Kiangsi Province; Kiangsi used to be part of the old Central-South military district. The ranking military commander and political officer of this headquarters--which lies just across the straits from Taiwan--are unknown. The deputy commanders, however, are of major general rank and one senior officer of the "Fukien Front" is a lieutenant general, which suggests that the commander of the Foochow headquarters is at least a colonel general. The exact relationship between the Foochow headquarters and the "Fukien Front," which Peiping continues to identify, remains obscure.

The old Central-South China military district also has been split into two commands with headquarters at Canton and Wuhan. Controlling the important coastal province of Kwangtung as well as Kwangsi and Hunan, Canton is much the more important of the two headquarters. It is commanded by Colonel General Huang Yung-sheng, who has served in the Canton area since the early 1950's. The political officer of this command may be Lieutenant General Liang Hsing-chu, but this is uncertain.

The Wuhan headquarters, which has jurisdiction over Hupei and Honan provinces, is commanded by Colonel General Chen Tsai-tao, former commander of the Honan military district for many years. The political officer of the Wuhan command is not known.

Very little information is available on either the Lanchow or Chengtu headquarters of the PLA. Lanchow headquarters includes Shensi, Tsinghai and Kansu Provinces. It controls approximately the same area as the old Northwest China military district headquarters except for Sinkiang which now has its own headquarters. The commander and political officer of the Lanchow headquarters are not known. It may be, in the light of the comparatively small number of troops in the Northwest, that the Lanchow headquarters is commanded by two lieutenant generals, Chang Ta-chih (a military commander) and Hsien Heng-han, the senior officers identified at Lanchow in January 1957.

The leading officer of the Chengtu headquarters is probably Ho Ping-yen, who has been identified in one regional newspaper as a colonel general of PLA troops in Chengtu. This command probably has jurisdiction over Szechuan and Kweichow Provinces. The military picture in the Southwest is confused by Peiping's continuing identification of Chungking headquarters of the PLA. It may be that the Chinese Communists are still in the process of moving the military headquarters in the Southwest from Chungking, the old military and administrative seat, to Chengtu.

Yunnan Province, which used to be part of the old Southwest China military district, is believed now to have its own headquarters at Kunming commanded by Colonel General Hsieh Fu-chih. Hsieh was a political officer in the Southwest command and is presently first secretary in Yunnan. He is also political officer of the Kunming headquarters.

The "autonomous" areas of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, formerly subordinate to the North, Northwest and Southwest China military districts, respectively, now seem to be major military areas, although on a level below those in China proper. Each of these headquarters is commanded by a lieutenant general: politburo member Ulanfu in Inner Mongolia; Wang En-mao in Sinkiang; and Chang Kuo-hua in Tibet. Ulanfu and Wang En-mao are probably also the political officers in their respective areas. The political officer in Tibet has long been Lieutenant General Tan Kuan-san.

## Relationships Among Party, Military and Police Figures

The various party, military and police figures in Communist China, as in the USSR, are in separate chains of command, all of which are ultimately responsible to organs of the party's central committee. At the top, the CCP politburo's standing committee and the party secretariat resemble the Soviet party secretariat; the Chinese Ministry of National Defense is equivalent to the Soviet Ministry of Defense; China's General Political Department is similar to the USSR's Main Political Administration; and the CCP's social affairs department (a party organ) has some resemblance to the Soviet Committee of State Security (a government organ).

The CCP constitution is explicit about central committee direction of party and military figures below the national level. Party organizations throughout the country "shall obey...the central committee...." Party organizations in the armed forces --that is, the party committees which are theoretically superior to both the military commanders and the political officer--"carry on their work in accordance with the instructions of the central committee...." The General Political Department, responsible for the "ideological and organizational work of the party" in the armed forces, is "under the direction of the central committee." (The constitution does not mention the covert police, which is directed by a department of the central committee.)

There is at least a formal difference--between the Soviet and Chinese systems--in the status of party committees in military formations. In the Soviet system there is a primary party organization in each of the military units in a military district, and there is also a primary party organization in the military district headquarters, but this latter is for headquarters personnel only. The Chinese also have primary party organizations in the military units, but the party committee located in the military district headquarters appears to represent all of the forces in that military district. Beyond this, the authority of the party committee in the Chinese military district or military unit--vis-a-vis military commanders and political officers--is theoretically far greater than that of party organizations in Soviet military formations.

The Chinese Communist formula for both party and military operations is that of "combining collective leadership with individual responsibility." In military operations, this is interpreted as "individual responsibility by the commanders

under the collective leadership of the party committee" in the formation. Minister of Defense Peng Te-huai noted at the CCP's 8th congress in September 1956 that these party committees exist at "all levels" of the armed forces, and that "all important matters"--e.g., directives from superior organizations, the planning of military, political and logistical tasks, and the transfer and assignment of personnel--should be discussed at the meetings of these party committees. The "collective leadership" of party committees is necessary "better to ensure the party's leadership" over the armed forces, said Peng, and as well as to "give full play to collective wisdon...." Peng went on to warn that "it is wrong for the party committees to interfere in day-to-day work and take everything into their hands...." Instead, the military commander and political officer are to be given "full responsibility in carrying out decisions made by the party committees."

Theoretically, these party committees in the military formations can compel the military commander and political officer to carry out committee "decisions" which are contrary to the wishes of those two persons. In practice, it is doubtful that this ever happens. The most important decisions are made by higher party and government organs, and are not reversible. As for the lesser decisions made at the level of the military formation, the party committee in the formation is always headed, so far as is known, by the military commander or the political officer or both, who are thus in a position to obtain committee approval of decisions they have already made.

Similarly, it would appear to be a mistake to accept at face value Chinese Communist assertions that the party committees in the military formations act in accordance with the "decisions of party committees of corresponding levels" (Peng Te-huai, 8th Congress) and that they accept "supervision" and "leadership" by these local party organizations (Tan Cheng, same occasion). Such statements, made in 1956, are consistent with the older description of the party committee in the military formation as "generally" subordinate to the local party committee of the corresponding level. The discussion of this relationship at the 8th Congress, however, strongly suggested that the relationship is one of liaison and coordination. For example, "supervision" was defined simply as the right of redress by local authorities against illegal actions by the military. Similarly, "leadership" was discussed simply in terms of soliciting and respecting the views of local authorities on such matters as requisitioning of farmland and displacement of people. The impression that there has been a

change in the relationship was reinforced by the reference to a policy, in effect since 1954, of encouraging military leaders to join the local party committees to "exchange information" on matters of common concern.

The relationship between the local party secretary in Communist China on one hand, and the military commander and political officer of the military district headquarters on the other, appears in practice to be much like the pattern in the USSR. The first secretary of the local party committee is the top-ranking official in the area insofar as party affairs are concerned, with authority (in party matters) over all persons who live or work in his area, including the ranking personnel of any military district headquarters located in his area. The military leaders are usually--perhaps always--members of the local party committee, and in this respect are subordinate to the local first secretary. The military leaders are not responsible to the local secretary, however, with respect to their military activities. The military commander is responsible to the Ministry of National Defense and the political officer is responsible to the General Political Department, although both are required to coordinate their work with the local party secretary. (The political officer, as a party representative, probably has a closer relationship with the local party secretary.)

The CCP constitution specifies that "the party organization in charge of party work in a defined area is regarded as the highest of all constituent party organizations in that area...." This might be interpreted as meaning that, when the party secretary and the military leaders of a given area cannot agree on a common action with respect to some question on which they "exchange information," the party secretary can enforce obedience on the military leaders. However, any major question involving the military headquarters would seem by definition to be larger than that of "party work" in the area. It thus seems likely that, when the local party secretary and the military commander and political officer cannot agree, the question is referred to higher levels, i.e., to Peiping.

The Chinese Communists continue to describe both military commanders and political officers as "leaders of troops," and to imply that their responsibilities are equal. The names of the military commanders and political officers are usually coupled in Chinese press references, and in most cases the two are of the same rank. This contrasts with the Soviet picture of military formations "headed by single commanders who have

concentrated in their hands all the commanding, political and administrative functions...." (Red Star, May 1956). Moreover, the Soviet political officer is known as the "deputy commander for political affairs," a title which clearly subordinates him to the military commander and which has never been observed in Chinese references to political officers.

In the Chinese as in the Soviet system, the primary function of the political officer is indoctrination, not surveillance. The scope of the Chinese officer's work appears to be wider than that of his Soviet counterpart, touching so many aspects of the soldier's life that some observers regard the political officer as responsible for almost everything except actual military operations. That the status of the political officer continues to create problems for Peiping is apparent in certain of Peng Te-huai's remarks at the 8th congress. Peng observed that it was necessary to combat any tendency toward "unduly emphasizing the special position and authority" of political work. At the same time, Peng, reflecting the party leadership's determination to preserve the "special position" of the political officer, observed that no tendency of "contempt for or hindrance of" political work would be tolerated.

The military commanders appear to have made some gains, vis-a-vis the political officers, in recent years. The Chinese picture in this respect is by no means as striking as the Soviet picture, but there have been certain changes. Of the 18 Soviet military district commanders, almost all rank their political officers by two or more grades, and six of them are members or candidate members of the CPSU central committee, whereas none of their political officers is either. Of the 13 (known or believed) Chinese military district commanders, three or four of them may now rank their political officers by one grade, and at least nine are members or alternate members of the CCP central committee, whereas only three or four of the political officers are either. Moreover, the Chinese seem to have changed that feature of their system which--as of 1951--"in general" placed the political officer at the head of the party committee in the military area or unit. While only two identifications of the first secretaries of party committees in major military districts have come to light in recent years, in both cases the committee was headed by the military commander rather than by the political officer: in 1954, Chen I as first secretary of the party committee of the East China military district, and, in 1957, Yang Cheng-wu as first secretary of the party committee of the Peiping headquarters. At least eight of the 13 Chinese military

district commanders are either superior to their political officers in party standing or hold the political officer's post concurrently, so it seems likely that the military commanders of most military districts are the first secretaries of the party committees of those military districts.

The status of the secret police in Communist China--that is, personnel of the CCP's social affairs department--is not clear, either at the national level or below. The little information at hand, however, suggests some similarity between the work of the Chinese secret police and the Soviet Committee (formerly Ministry) of State Security (KGB). The Soviet body, a government rather than party organ, has subordinate units in each republic and oblast, and has representatives in military formations at all levels; these personnel do not maintain liaison and seldom know one another. The Chinese body, a party rather than government organ, is known to have its subordinate departments in regional, provincial and municipal party committees, and is believed either to direct or to supervise the counterintelligence sections of military formations.

The KGB unit in a Soviet republic or oblast seems to be something like a combined FBI/CIA apparatus, responsible for all intelligence activities in that area. It is not the dread secret police of Stalin's day, a personal instrument with enormous power. While the KGB unit's activities do include surveillance of personnel, it cannot take arbitrary action against them, and its purview probably does not extend to the party secretaries. The first secretary of a Soviet republic or oblast party committee appears to supervise the work of the KGB unit's chairman there, in the sense that he supervises all government work there; and the KGB chairman is usually subordinate to the secretary along another line as a member of the republic or oblast party committee or bureau. The first secretary of a Soviet republic or oblast party committee seems to be in a much stronger position than the KGB chairman there.

The status of the CCP's social affairs department under Mao has all along seemed to be closer to the current status of the Soviet KGB than to the secret police under Stalin. The social affairs department is subordinate to the secretariat in the party structure at the national level and below the national level, and the director of the social affairs department of a

regional party bureau or provincial or municipal party committee is thus a subordinate of the first secretary of the bureau or committee. Moreover, most of the first secretaries of these bureaus and committees immediately below the national level are members or alternate members of the CCP central committee. While the identity of only a few social affairs representatives at this level is known or suspected, none of these is on the CCP central committee, and there are only a few central committee members in unidentified posts--some of which might be social affairs posts--below the national level. However, the scope of the work of the social affairs departments is not clear, and it is not known to what degree the party secretaries supervise the work of social affairs representatives or are even cognizant of that work.

In the USSR, the counterintelligence section of the Committee of State Security has its special sections (O.O.'s) throughout the military structure. These are administratively subordinate to the military commander but work independently of both the military commander and the political officer, and are not accountable to them. The mission of the special sections is definitely surveillance (not indoctrination, the political officer's province), and such surveillance includes the military commander. Like the first secretary of a republic or oblast party committee, however, the military commander seems to be in a stronger position than the KGB representative.

There has been no reliable information for some years on the work of the social affairs department apparatus in the Chinese Communist armed forces, and there has been some speculation that such an apparatus no longer exists. In this connection, not one person among a large group of Chinese POW's of the Korean war, interviewed at length, referred to any special secret police apparatus; each instead depicted the well-known Chinese system of surveillance and reporting by each against all. It is conceivable that the Chinese Communists no longer see a need for a separate body of secret operatives in an independent chain of command. However, the assignment since 1955 of Li Ko-nung as a deputy chief of staff in the PLA headquarters would suggest that the social affairs department type of operation in the armed forces is very much alive. Li is the former head of the social affairs department, his entire career has been spent in such work, and he has no known qualifications for any other type of work in the armed forces.

Pending clarification, it is assumed that the counter-intelligence function in Chinese military formations is still located in a political security section of the political department of each formation, and that, as in the Soviet System, these sections are not accountable to the military commander or political officer. The chief of the political security section probably is the member for security on the party committee in the military unit, and in this post subordinate to the military commander and political officer as the ranking secretaries of the committee. As is the case with the first secretaries of provincial committees, most of the military commanders of major military districts are members or alternate members of the CCP central committee and are thus considerably superior in party standing to the party police representatives in their commands. Most of the political officers are probably also superior to the police representatives in this respect.

In sum, the first secretaries of party committees and the military commanders of military districts appear to be more important figures--at the level immediately below the national level in China--than the political officers and covert police officials, and the political officers are probably more important than the police. In recent years the military commanders have somewhat improved their position vis-a-vis both the political officers and local party secretaries.

Alignments Among Key Figures

Vertical alignments--that is, the relationship of key figures at the regional level with party leaders at the national level--appear to be important with respect to the total strength of various conjectured groups in Peiping. Horizontal alignments--that is, the relationship between party secretaries, military commanders, political officers and police figures--appear to be important with respect to the capabilities of regional administrations for acting independently of Peiping or in the service of one or another group in Peiping. Information at hand does not permit confident conclusions, but will support some preliminary speculation, as to vertical alignments. Information as to horizontal alignments--except where the question answers itself, through the concurrent occupancy of all or most key posts by one man--is in most cases so fragmentary that little more can be said than that persons who have worked together for several years may be close friends.

A very few men continue to hold the key posts in the major "autonomous" areas of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. Ulanfu

of Inner Mongolia, who has held the three top posts there (or their equivalent) since 1947--party secretary, military commander and political officer--cannot be aligned with any center of power in Peiping. While Ulanfu spends much or most of his time in Peiping, he is regarded not as a group leader in his own right but as a possibly major asset to a leader. Most of Ulanfu's deputies in Inner Mongolia appear to be his protegés. The senior deputy in the party post, Kuei Pi, is a Mongol who has worked under Ulanfu since 1941. Ulanfu's two military deputies, Kung Fei and Liu Hua-hsiang (last reported in 1955) are little known but Kung at least has been with Ulanfu since the 1940's. Ulanfu's deputy political officer, known as Ting Mou or Ting Mao, also a Mongol, has worked under him for several years. Peiping's principal check on Ulanfu and his protegés may be Su Chien-i, a Chinese who has spent all his known career in Inner Mongolia and was a deputy secretary there in 1955; there has been no news of Su since that time.

Wang En-mao in Sinkiang, who has held the three top posts there since 1954, may be in an even stronger position than is Ulanfu in Inner Mongolia, as Wang spends almost all of his time in Sinkiang. Wang has risen under several party leaders now in important positions in Peiping, including Defense Minister Peng Te-huai, but he cannot plausibly be aligned with any of them. The second-ranking figure, the Uighur Saifudin, is the senior deputy in the party post and deputy military commander, as well as chairman of the government. He has been a CCP member only since 1950 and cannot be aligned with any Chinese Communist leader.

Because Chang Ching-wu in the past two years has spent little time in Tibet, authority on the spot has been largely in the hands of Chang Kuo-hua. Chang, acting secretary of the Tibet work committee and commander of the Tibet military district, has been associated with party leader Teng Hsiao-ping since the 1940's. Tan Kuan-san, the political officer, is said to be an old friend of Mao Tse-tung's. Fan Ming, a deputy secretary and deputy political officer, is little known. Chang, Tan and Fan have worked together in Tibet for several years, but nothing more is known of their relationships with one another.

Authority in Northeast China is divided among many party and military leaders, as might be expected after the fall of Kao Kang. No one party leader in Peiping appears to have a dominant influence in the Northeast, although Peng Chen, the party leader there after World War II, may have some protegés in provincial posts.

The center of power in the Northeast is at Mukden, the location of headquarters of the Northeast military district and the Liaoning provincial party committee. The commander of the Mukden headquarters, Teng Hua, who has had this post since 1955, may have begun as a protegé of Mao Tse-tung, was for many years closely associated with Lin Piao, and since 1951 has seemed close to Peng Te-huai. Teng is probably the first secretary of the party committee in the Northeast military district, as his party rank is considerably higher than that of anyone else in the headquarters (or in Manchuria as a whole). Chou Huan, the political officer of his command since 1955, may have been with Lin Piao before 1950, but nothing is known of his relationships in his past seven years in the Northeast. The deputy military commander, Wu Hsin-chuan, has been known only since 1954 and only in this post. The deputy political officer since 1955, Tu Ping, was a deputy of Kan Ssu-chi (now deputy director of the General Political Department in Peiping) in Korea. Of these four, Teng and Tu are known to have worked together before 1955 (in Korea), and Wu may also have come to the Northeast from a Korean command.

Of the three provincial party first secretaries in the Northeast, Huang Ou-tung in Liaoning seems to have the key post, due to the military and economic importance of Liaoning and Huang's presumed role as liaison officer with the Mukden headquarters. (For this reason, it is puzzling that Huang is inferior in party rank to the secretary in Heilungkiang Province.) Huang, who has held key party and government posts in the Northeast since World War II, was for years subordinate to Peng Chen in Manchuria and is probably a protegé of Peng's. Huang is not known to have been associated with any of the military leaders of the Mukden headquarters before becoming first secretary in Liaoning in 1954. Wu Te, first secretary in Kirin, has a varied background in labor work and party posts suggesting relationships with Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen and Po I-po, each a key figure in Peiping.. Ouyang Chin, first secretary in Heilungkiang, may also be a protegé of Peng Chen, while Ouyang's deputy, Han Kuang, has been with Ouyang for several years and looks to be Ouyang's own protegé. Han may, however, be the secret police figure on the Heilungkiang committee. The commanders of the provincial military districts in the Northeast are little known, and the political officers are unknown. However, provincial military leaders would be regarded as important figures only if they were to hold leading positions in major military headquarters located in their provinces. Provincial military leaders will not be discussed further, except where they may hold posts in major headquarters.

The headquarters of the CPV in Korea--which is not subordinate to the Northeast and is considered here merely for convenience--is a center of power in a restricted sense, in view of its location among non-Chinese. Chinese forces in Korea are almost as strong as Chinese forces in Manchuria, and probably stronger than North Korean ground forces. Yang Yung, the military commander and probably the first secretary of the party committee in the Pyongyang headquarters, has been associated with several military leaders--Lin Piao, Liu Po-cheng, Peng Te-huai and Yang Te-chih--but cannot be aligned with any of them. Li Chih-min, the political officer, came to Korea from Peng Te-huai's command in the Northwest, possibly at Peng's instance. Yang and Li have worked together since at least 1955. The equivalent of a local party committee, for liaison with this headquarters, is probably Peiping's embassy in Pyongyang. Peiping's ambassador used to be a party leader from the Northwest associated with Peng Te-huai, and is now a little-known party official from Kwangsi.

The center of power in Northwest China is at Lanchow, the headquarters of the Northwest military district and the Kansu provincial committee of the CCP. The key figures in Lanchow and elsewhere in the Northwest have in most cases been associated with Peng Te-huai--who was for years both the party leader and the military leader in the Northwest--either directly or through a protegé of Peng's.

The military commander of the Lanchow headquarters may be Chang Ta-chih, who has been in the Northwest for many years and is a long-time subordinate and possible protegé of Peng's. The political officer may be Hsien Heng-han, who in that event would have succeeded a protegé of Peng's, Liao Han-sheng, whom Peng has since brought to Peiping. The only other senior officer known to be with the Lanchow headquarters is Han Lien-cheng, who used to be chief of staff of the Northwest military district and in that post succeeded yet another protegé of Peng's, Peng Shao-hui, also brought to Peiping. The three officers have worked together at least since 1954. The key figure of the lot would seem to be Chang Ta-chih, still relatively young (in his 40's), the only one of them to be a member (alternate) of the CCP's central committee, and probably the secretary of the party committee of the Northwest military district.

Chang Chung-liang, the first secretary to Lanchow and presumably the party's liaison man with Lanchow headquarters, has been a subordinate of Peng Te-huai's in both military and party posts in the Northwest. However, Chang's career seems to have

run its course; his previous subordinates have passed him, and he has not been elected to the CCP central committee. A more important figure in his own right, although lacking a close relationship with the military leaders at Lanchow, is Chang Te-sheng, first secretary in Shensi. Chang, the highest-ranking party official known to be in the Northwest, has also held important party posts under Peng Te-huai. The first secretary in Tsinghai, Kao Feng, has been known only since 1954 and only in this post.

There are two centers of power in Southwest China, one at Chengtu and the other at Kunming. Just as the key figures in the Northwest have generally been associated directly or indirectly with Peng Te-huai, most of the key figures in the Southwest have been associated with Teng Hsiao-ping, who until 1952 was the party leader in the area.

Li Ching-chuan, the party's first secretary in Szechuan, and the party's liaison man with the Chengtu headquarters, has held this post since Szechuan was given a unified administration in 1953. Li was closely associated with Teng Hsiao-ping, and was probably chosen by Teng for the post of first secretary. Li's senior deputy, Li Ta-chang, was associated with Peng Chen in the Northeast after World War II and then with Teng in the Southwest, who has risen since 1953 with his current superior Li Ching-chuan. The third-ranking party figure in Szechuan, Yen Hung-yen, was a lieutenant of Teng Hsiao-ping in the period 1949-52. The probable military commander of the Chengtu headquarters, Ho Ping-yen, a sometime subordinate and possibly a nephew of Ho Lung, spent some time with Peng Te-huai in the Northwest and was with Ho Lung again in the Southwest in the period 1952-54. The political officer of the Chengtu headquarters, who has never been identified, might be either Li Ching-chuan or Yen Hung-yen (see above), who have been the political officer and deputy political officer of the Szechuan provincial military district. All of the known key figures in Chengtu have worked together for several years.

In Yunnan, Hsieh Fu-chih, first secretary of the party's provincial committee, is concurrently commander of the Kunming headquarters. Hsieh, long a lieutenant of Teng Hsiao-ping in the Southwest, has been the first secretary in Yunnan since 1953, succeeding another protegé of Teng's, Sung Jen-chiung. Hsieh has also been political officer of the Yunnan provincial military district since 1953, and may now be the political officer of the Kunming headquarters. If so, Hsieh, the highest-ranking party official now in the Southwest, would hold concurrently the three most important posts in Yunnan. Hsieh's

deputy military commander, Chin Chi-wei, is known only as an associate of Hsieh's. The only identified deputy secretary is the little-known Yu I-chuan.

In Kweichow, Chou Lin, first secretary of the provincial committee, is not regarded as a person of the same importance as the other two first secretaries in the Southwest. Chou, who came to the Southwest from East China in 1951, held no significant party posts until given this provincial secretaryship in 1955, and is not a member of the CCP central committee.

There is a divided center of power in East China, one part at Shanghai and the other at Nanking. The person whose influence is most apparent in both centers is not a former regional leader transferred to Peiping--such as Chen I or the purged Jao Shu-shih--but Ko Ching-shih, the present secretary of the Shanghai bureau (with jurisdiction over Kiangsu and Chekiang and possibly over Anhwei, Fukien and Kiangsi as well) and concurrently first secretary of the Shanghai municipal committee.

Ko, whose standing in the CCP central committee is higher than that of four politburo members, became first secretary of the provincial committee of Kiangsu (in which both Shanghai and Nanking are located) in 1952, and transferred from Nanking to Shanghai in 1955 following the fall of Jao Shu-shih and the removal to Peiping of Chen I. Ko's background suggests association with both Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen, but his alignment is uncertain. None of Ko's deputies on the Shanghai bureau has been identified, but they probably include some of the secretaries of provincial committees in the bureau's jurisdiction. Another likely member is Hsu Chien-kuo, a deputy minister of public security assigned to Shanghai who is the leading suspect as the ranking secret police figure in East China.

Chen Pei-hsien, second secretary of the Shanghai municipal committee, who has been with Ko only since 1955, is apparently a specialist in economic affairs. Next in importance is Tsao Ti-chiu, who began his career in East China, was then for a time party secretary in Chungking under Teng Hsiao-ping, and since 1955 has been with Ko in Shanghai. Hsu Chien-kuo (see above), who has directed the public security department in Shanghai since 1951, is known to be a member of the Shanghai committee. Another important person is Wang Pi-cheng, commander of the Shanghai garrison, but Wang is little known.

In Nanking the party leader is Chiang Wei-ching, first secretary of the Kiangsu provincial committee and presumably the liaison man with the Nanking headquarters. Chiang was

subordinate to Ko Ching-shih in Kiangsu in 1953-54. Hsu Shih-yu, the military commander of the Nanking headquarters and probably first secretary of the party committee of that headquarters, was reportedly an early opponent of Mao Tse-tung. For several years Hsu was with Chen I and Su Yu in East China, and is said to be a protegé of Chen's. The deputy commander, Kuo Hua-jo, is said to have begun as a protegé of Mao Tse-tung, to have clashed later with Chou En-lai, and to have been demoted for military failures. Kuo re-emerged under Chen I, and has been identified in Nanking since 1955. The political officer of the Nanking headquarters, Tang Liang, was associated with Ko Ching-shih in Nanking in the 1952-55 period. The deputy political officer may be Lieutenant General Hsiao Wang-tung, subordinate to Ko in Kiangsu in 1952-53. Two persons of great prestige are currently located in Nanking, but without military commands: Liu Po-cheng, ex-commander of the 2nd Field Army, and Lin Piao, ex-commander of the 4th Field Army, both members of the CCP politburo.

Chiang Hua, first secretary of the Chekiang committee (subordinate to the Shanghai bureau) appears to have a less important job than the first secretary in Kiangsu, in that his province no longer contains a major military headquarters. Chiang may be a protegé of either Tan Chen-lin (now in the party secretariat) or Tan Chi-lung (now in Shantung), his predecessors in his current post. The secret police figure in Chekiang may be Li Feng-ping, who has been associated with Chiang there for several years.

In the East China provinces of Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien the question of centers of power is clouded by ignorance as to whether these provinces are subordinate to the Shanghai bureau in political as well as economic matters and as to the identity of certain military leaders. The ranking party official in these three provinces is Tseng Hsi-sheng, first secretary in Anhwei, who has held the first secretary's post since the province was given a unified administration in 1952. Tseng may have begun as a protegé of Liu Shao-chi, but there is no basis for aligning him with anyone at this time. Yang Shang-kuei, the first secretary and political officer in Kiangsi, who has been in his present post since 1953, likewise cannot be aligned.

The nearest thing to a center of power in these three East China provinces would appear to be Foochow, the location of the Fukien provincial committee and the Foochow military headquarters. Yeh Fei, a party leader in Fukien for almost 30 years and the provincial first secretary since 1954, has been associated with many East China leaders now near the top of the party. Yeh is

concurrently the commander of the Fukien military district, may be its political officer, and is presumably the party liaison man with the Foochow headquarters. The commander of the Foochow headquarters, presumed to be a colonel general, is unknown, and his deputies are little known; one of these deputies may command the "Fukien Front." The political officer of the Foochow headquarters and his deputies are unknown.

The center of power in the Central China provinces of Hupei and Hunan is Wuhan, a now official amalgamation of three Yangtze river cities, Hankow, Hanyang and Wuchang (capital of Hupei), the location of the Wuhan military headquarters and the Hupei provincial party committee. The military commander since 1955, Colonel General Chen Tsai-tao, was a long-time military subordinate of Liu Po-cheng and political subordinate of Teng Hsiao-ping in the Southwest. The political officer at Wuhan may be Tan Fu-jen, who may have earlier been a lieutenant of Tan Cheng in South China. The party liaison man with the Wuhan headquarters is Wang Jen-chung, first secretary of the Hupei committee since 1954, who appears to be on friendly terms with Mao Tse-tung but cannot be aligned. The first secretary in Honan as of 1955, Pan Fu-sheng, had had minor posts in North China previously, but likewise cannot be aligned. Wu Chih-pu, who may have succeeded Pan as first secretary in Honan, cannot be aligned with any one of the many party leaders with whom he has been associated.

The center of power in South China is at Canton, the location of the strong Kwangtung provincial committee of the party and of the Canton military headquarters, with the great majority of the latter's 325,000 troops stationed in Kwangtung. The key figure in Canton and in South China as a whole is Tao Chu, first secretary of the Kwangtung committee of the CCP and the liaison man with the Canton headquarters. Tao, the only full member of the CCP central committee now active in South China, was in the Northeast with Lin Piao's forces after World War II, returned to Central China as a political officer with Lin's forces, became a secretary of the CCP's South China subbureau, in 1953-54 was acting secretary of that subbureau, and since 1955 has held his present post. Tao has been closely associated with Tan Chang (now of the party secretariat), his immediate superior in the 1949-54 period. One of Tao's deputies in Kwangtung, Ku Ta-tsun, long a party leader there, was one of three alternate members of the CCP central committee not elevated to full membership last year, and appears to be just living his life out in his native place; the three females--Ou Meng-chueh, Li

Chien-nien, and Chang Yun--have been with Tao for years. The secret police functionary on this committee might be Wen Ming-sheng, who has been associated with Tao for several years.

The military commander of the Canton headquarters since 1955, Huang Yung-sheng, is probably also the secretary of the party committee of that headquarters. Huang's early career was spent mainly under Nieh Jung-chen and his later career mostly under Yeh Chien-ying, two military leaders who now seem to be of small importance. His deputy commander, Wen Nien-sheng, has been with Huang for several years and may be his protegé. Neither of the possible political officers of this headquarters, Liang Hsing-chu and Liu Hsing-yuan, is known.

The replacement for the party first secretary in Kwangsi, removed in June 1957, has not been identified. A full member of the CCP central committee, Chang Yun-i, may be living in Kwangsi and might nominally act as first secretary there, but Chang has been in retirement and is not regarded as an important figure. The post is more likely to be held by Wei Kuo-ching, governor of Kwangsi, a onetime associate of Chen I and Su Yu. The first secretary in Hunan, Chou Hsiao-chou, who has held this post since 1953, is apparently not a major figure. Chou was the only provincial first secretary who played no role whatever at the CCP's eighth congress last year, in that he neither made an address nor was elected to the central committee.

The most important center of power in North China is of course Peiping, the location of the Peiping municipal committee of the CCP--by far the most important of the municipal committees--and of the Peiping military headquarters. The influence of two politburo members, Peng Chen and Po I-po, is apparent throughout North China and in the city of Peiping.

Peng Chen, first secretary of the Peiping committee, has been tentatively aligned [redacted] with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in an "organizational" group at the center of the party structure. As previously noted, however, Peng may bear some resentment against both Liu and Teng, as the result of Teng having displaced Peng since 1953 as Liu's first lieutenant for party work. Peng's senior deputy on the Peiping committee, Liu Jen, the second secretary and director of the committee's organization department, is almost certainly Peng Chen's protegé. 25X1

The commander of the Peiping headquarters, Yang Cheng-wu, appears to have been a protegé of Nieh Jung-chen early in his

career and in recent years has seemed close to Peng Te-huai, although he cannot be aligned with Peng. Chu Liang-tsai, the political officer, who has worked with Yang for several years, may be a protegé of Po I-po. The deputy commander, Cheng Wei-shan, has been associated for many years, for varying periods, with his superior Yang Cheng-wu. The deputy political officer, Chang Nan-sheng, is an unknown.

Huang Kuo-ching, the first secretary of the other major municipal committee in North China, at Tientsin, may be another protegé of Peng Chen's. Huang has no connection with military forces, however, apart from the Tientsin garrison. The military commander of that garrison is little known, and the political officer is unknown. The secret police figure in Tientsin might be Wan Hsiao-tang, for several years the director of public security there.

Although Peiping and Tientsin are both in Hopei, the capital of that province is Paoting, the location of the provincial party committee. Lin Tieh, the first secretary in Hopei and probably still the political officer of that province, may be another protegé of Po I-po's. Lin's deputy in Hopei, Ma Kuo-jui, has been with him since 1949 and is probably his protegé. Tao Lu-chia, the first secretary of the Shansi committee, is probably the political officer concurrently, and may be another protegé of Po's.

A second center of power in North China is at Tsinan, location of the strong Shantung provincial committee of the CCP and of the Tsinan military headquarters. Shantung seems increasingly to show the influence of Teng Hsiao-ping.

The ranking party leader in Shantung, Shu Tung, first secretary of the Shantung committee, worked in Shantung after World War II, went to Shanghai in 1949 under Jao Shu-shih, and moved back to Shantung in 1954 after Jao's fall and the transfer of Kang Sheng to Peiping. Shu's senior deputy in Shantung, Tan Chi-lung, was long a party secretary and political officer in East China. Both Shu and Tan were closely associated for many years with Tan Chen-lin, now the fourth-ranking figure in the party's central secretariat under Teng Hsiao-ping. The third-ranking party secretary in Shantung, Chao Chien-min, a onetime protegé of Teng Hsiao-ping's in the Southwest, was brought to Peiping with Teng in 1952 and assigned to Shantung (probably by Teng) in 1955. The military commander of the Tsinan headquarters, Wang Shu-sheng, has spent most of his career under Lin Piao but in recent years has seemed close to Peng Te-huai. The deputy commander is unknown. The political

officer is believed to be Wang Hsin-ting, who had been associated in the Southwest with Teng Hsiao-ping and with Sung Jen-chiung, a protegé of Teng's. The deputy political officer is probably Peng Chia-ching, who succeeded the purged Hsiang Ming in 1954 and is little known.

The Current Status of "Independent Kingdoms"

A "center of power" has been defined in this study as a combination of a major party headquarters with a major military district headquarters, these being physically located in the same major city. (In one center of power--East China--the party headquarters and the military headquarters are in different cities.) An "independent kingdom" has been defined as a center of power which has some potential either for defiance of Peiping or for manipulation by one group of party leaders in Peiping.

A "kingdom" implies a common cause or allegiance--horizontally or vertically or both--on the part of the key figures of a center of power--particularly the first secretary of the party's local bureau or committee, the military commander of the military headquarters, and the political officer of that headquarters. This condition for a "kingdom" is obviously met where there is an absence of the normal checks and balances through various individuals in separate chains of command, i.e., where one man holds all of the key posts. The condition could be met even where the key posts are divided among several persons, through the development of a close personal relationship among the key figures or through their rise under a single patron in Peiping.

One factor in the strength of the one key figure or the few key figures of a center of power is length of tenure. Communist China, more than the USSR, has allowed regional leaders to remain for many years in their areas. The longer the tenure, the more opportunity to build personal power, particularly through the development of protegés. (No doubt a man permitted to build power in this fashion is regarded as particularly reliable; but Peiping can be mistaken, e.g., on Kao Kang.)

Another factor is the military and economic capabilities of a center of power. That is, in order to qualify as a significant "independent kingdom," a regional command would have to be able to operate for a considerable period against military forces of other military districts, and without the materiel and foodstuffs ordinarily supplied from points outside its area of control. As an alternative to local supply of necessary materiel and foodstuffs, some regional administrations are contiguous to foreign states which might be willing to make trouble for Peiping or might

favor one group of leaders in Peiping over another group. Moreover, a given command could enhance its prospects by joining forces with another command; e.g., if the Mukden administration (once the headquarters of Kao Kang) and the Shanghai-Nanking administration (once the headquarters of Jao Shu-shih) were to make common cause, their joint resources would be formidable indeed.

The intentions of key figures in a center of power, with respect either to setting up against Peiping or throwing their weight behind a given leader in Peiping in his struggle for power, are very hard to judge. Factors working for a challenge to Peiping might be ambition, disappointment with one's fortunes, resentment of demands imposed by Peiping, the development of sympathy with regional as opposed to national interests, or disaffection for the Communist cause itself. The principal factor in a decision by the key figures to ally themselves (at any time) with a given leader in Peiping, to be used by him (at the proper time) either as a latent threat or as an actively engaged force, would seem to be ambition. That is, it would clearly be of value to a key figure in a center of power at the regional level, while engaged in building power there, to have a powerful patron in Peiping; and, if a struggle for power were to develop among the leaders in Peiping, the early supporters of the winning faction could reasonably expect to be rewarded. (On the other side of that coin: a regional leader would be prudent to calculate carefully the strength of the various contestants in Peiping, and a given leader in Peiping might find at the moment of crisis that certain of his supposed followers had accepted a better offer or had decided to wait for the dust to settle.)

There is no center of power at the regional level in Communist China in which all of the conditions appear to be present to justify its description as an "independent kingdom" in the first sense of that concept--the capability and the apparent intention of separating from Peiping. Moreover, as the Chinese Communist armed forces are modernized, defiance of Peiping by a regional command becomes increasingly difficult and increasingly less likely. There seems only a small possibility that any group of regional leaders, acting as a unit, will overtly defy Peiping. However, there are several areas in which enough of the conditions of an "independent kingdom" are present to make the area seem worth watching.

In the other sense of the concept of an "independent kingdom"-- a possible common allegiance, on the part of key figures of that center of power to a leader in a powerful group in Peiping--several of the regional administrations appear to qualify,

wholly or in large part. This consideration, while slippery, in that a present allegiance by no means guarantees a future responsiveness, would seem of some importance in attempting to assess the total power of the various conjectured groups in Peiping.

Some of the provincial, as well as regional, administrations display a coincidence of certain critical factors. For example, Lin Tieh in Hopei holds at least two and perhaps all three of the most important posts, has been the top man there since 1949, has developed protegés there, and may have a patron on the party politburo. However, Lin's situation is of little interest, as his establishment in Paoting is not a center of appreciable power. Paoting is not the headquarters of a military district and thus it controls only provincial troops, and a Paoting insurrection could be rapidly brought into line by forces of the nearby Peiping headquarters. The same considerations apply to the similar situations in the provinces of Shansi and Kiangsu.

A step above the provincial administrations--more important as centers of power than any of them, but less important than other centers of power above the provincial level--are the administrations centered at Kueisui (Inner Mongolia), Urumchi (Sinkiang), Lhasa (Tibet), Wuhan (Central China), Lanchow (Northwest China), and Pyongyang (North Korea).

Ulanfu's command in Inner Mongolia has the appearance of an "independent kingdom." Ulanfu has held all of the top posts there for ten years, and his protegés are in most of the other key posts. He is a Mongol, of a people long hostile to the Chinese. He spent years in the USSR, and has connections with leaders of the Soviet satellite Outer Mongolia. However, Ulanfu has only a few thousand troops, and the Inner Mongolian economy is now marginal, so he would require strong military and economic support in any effort to operate independently of Peiping. His situation would thus seem to be of major interest only if the USSR, directly or through Outer Mongolia, were to attempt to draw the Inner Mongolian regime away from Peiping. Moreover, Ulanfu seems to be a tame Mongol, and the Chinese have treated him very well. As a member of the CCP politburo with some following in Inner Mongolia, he might be an asset to one or another group in Peiping; he cannot be aligned with any of them.

Wang En-mao (a Han Chinese) in Sinkiang also has something close to an "independent kingdom," having worked there since 1949 and holding now the three most important posts concurrently. He

is in a stronger position than Ulanfu in two important respects--he spends almost all of his time in Sinkiang, and he commands more than 80,000 regular troops, a larger force than the forces of either of the two nearest major headquarters, Lanchow and Lhasa, and possibly larger than their combined forces. However, Wang, like Ulanfu, seems to have been well treated by the party leadership. The more interesting figure, in terms of possible separatist action, is Wang's deputy Saifudin. Saifudin is a Uighur, like most of the five million people of Sinkiang, who are ethnically similar to the people across the border in the USSR and have long been rebellious against the Chinese. Various groups in Sinkiang have engaged in armed resistance against the Chinese administration in recent years, and there is a substantial number of Uighurs in the military forces there now. Saifudin was early associated with the Uighur independence movement, spent several years in the USSR after fleeing Sinkiang, and was an official of the Soviet-sponsored Ili regime in northwestern Sinkiang during World War II. The situation in Sinkiang would become particularly interesting if Saifudin (who is only about 42) were to replace Wang En-mao or another Han Chinese in the top-ranking positions in Sinkiang, or, as with Inner Mongolia, if the USSR were to resume its efforts to separate Sinkiang from the rest of China. Neither Wang nor Saifudin is identified with any particular group in Peiping.

Chang Kuo-hua in Tibet is in much the same position as Ulanfu in Inner Mongolia and Wang En-mao in Sinkiang, in that he holds two of the three most important posts concurrently, is clearly the principal figure on the spot, and has been there, with his deputies, for several years. Chang may be stronger than either Ulanfu or Wang in one respect, in that he may have a top-level patron--Teng Hsiao-ping--in Peiping. Moreover, Chang may have grounds for complaint against Peiping, as he may have been blamed for Peiping's troubles in Tibet. However, Chang probably could not set up against Peiping. Chang is not a Tibetan and there are no Tibetans in key posts in Tibet, where the non-Chinese natives are hostile and where there has been much unrest since 1955. Without connections with Peiping, Chinese forces there probably could not survive even as an occupation force, to say nothing of preserving their kingdom against forces from other areas. Materiel and foodstuffs could come from India, but this seems unlikely. As for the value of a Tibetan "kingdom" to Teng Hsiao-ping, in maneuvering for position against other centers of power in Peiping, this would seem to be very small. Tibet itself is important to Peiping mainly in terms of political prestige, and could not be used as a political and military base in anything like the same way that a base in, say, Chengtu or Nanking could be used.

Wuhan in Central China is of some strategic importance as a transport center, but the Wuhan administration lacks certain essentials of an "independent kingdom." The key positions are divided among several men, none of whom seems to be a major figure, and they have worked together only for two years or so. None of the three is suspected of disaffection. There is probably no major arsenal in the area, and no alternative source of supply. Two of the three key figures at Wuhan--the military commander and the political officer--may be protegés, respectively, of Teng Hsiao-ping and of Tan Cheng, himself a deputy of Teng's in the party secretariat in Peiping. Teng's influence in this command, controlling a modest military force of about 80,000 troops, may represent a minor asset for Teng.

Lanchow in Northwest China is of some strategic importance in controlling traffic on a major route to Sinkiang and the USSR. Sian is also of some importance in view of plans to make the Sian-Paochi area of Shensi a major industrial center. The great majority of the 52,000 troops of the Northwest headquarters are in Kansu and Tsinghai, but there is some air power at Sian. The three key figures in Lanchow and the party secretary in Sian have all been in the Northwest for several years, and the Lanchow trio has worked together since 1954. One of them, the party secretary at Lanchow, may conceivably be disaffected, due to his lack of advancement in the party. However, the Northwest leaders, like those in Tibet, could not present much of a threat to Peiping. While an arsenal complex may develop at Sian, the area does not have the economic resources to survive as a center of power without Peiping. The Northwest is of more interest at this time because of the influence of Peng Te-huai in the area. Most of the key figures--both military and political--came up under Peng in the Northwest, and may be his protegés. This consideration adds a little to Peng's importance as a center of power in Peiping.

Much the same things can be said of the headquarters of the CPV in Korea, important primarily because the North Korean regime depends for its survival on the presence of strong and unusually good Chinese forces--currently about 290,000--in North Korea. The key posts are divided among three men--the military commander, the political officer, and Peiping's ambassador. Two of the three have been in Korea for several years and have worked together for at least two years. However, the Pyongyang headquarters is entirely dependent on Peiping for materiel. If the Chinese leaders in Pyongyang were to defy Peiping, they could survive only by association with similarly defiant leaders in Manchuria. Peng Te-huai's hand is apparent in this headquarters as well as in Northwest China. The military commander at Pyongyang was associated

with Peng in Korea, and the political officer was with Peng earlier in the Northwest, and both may owe their rise in recent years primarily to Peng. While Peng's power is based primarily on his position as minister of defense, the presence of these and other protegés in key military posts outside Peiping reinforces it.

Of greater importance as centers of power and of greater interest as "independent kingdoms" at this time are the administrations at Foochow (Southeast China), Chengtu and Kunming (both in Southwest China), and Tsinan (Shantung). In each of them there appear to be more of the factors making for a "kingdom," in one or the other of the two senses, than in the commands previously discussed.

The Foochow locus is important primarily in terms of its situation opposite Taiwan. Only one of the key figures there, Yeh Fei, is currently known. Yeh does appear to have an "independent kingdom" in Fukien Province, apart from the Foochow headquarters. This major military district comprises Fukien Province and possibly Kiangsi Province, with perhaps 175,000 troops, including some unusually good units. Should Yeh, who has been building a following in Fukien for three decades, turn out to be also the military commander and/or political officer of the Foochow headquarters, the picture would be most interesting. Geographical factors would favor the survival of a defiant regime in Fukien. The province has been isolated by mountains, communications are still rudimentary, and they could easily be seized. Moreover, a revolt against Peiping by Fukien leaders could be supported militarily and economically from Taiwan. As for the Foochow administration's value to any group at the center, Yeh is not known to be anyone's follower.

The Chengtu administration is important as the center of a major agricultural area, a growing industrial region, and a population of more than 80,000,000 (about 67,000,000 in Szechuan, about 16,000,000 in Kweichow). There is a complex of arsenals at Chungking. The key positions at Chengtu are divided among several persons, but most of them have been together for several years and have a highly important top-level patron, Teng Hsiao-ping. None of them is known to have good cause for disaffection, although the military commander may be annoyed at not being elected to the CCP central committee, and the increasing demands made on Szechuan's agriculture may conceivably lead to trouble. The picture at Chengtu is chiefly remarkable for the degree to which Teng Hsiao-ping has a kingdom there. All three of the ranking party secretaries at Chengtu appear to be Teng's protegés. One of those three is probably the political officer of the Chengtu

headquarters, which commands about 75,000 troops. The military commander has been associated more with Ho Lung and Peng Te-huai than with Teng, but his close association with Teng's protegés in recent years may have made him a member of that group. The Chengtu complex looks to be a significant asset for Teng at the center.

The Kunming administration is of some strategic importance in that it borders on Burma and Indochina. It has more of the characteristics of an "independent kingdom" than any other major center of power. Hsieh Fu-chih holds at least two and possibly all three of the top posts there. He has been in the Southwest for many years and the dominant figure in Yunnan for four years, and is the highest-ranking party official in the Southwest. The only identified political and military deputies in Yunnan appear to be Hsieh's protegés. Hsieh has powerful patrons in Peiping in Teng Hsiao-ping and Sun Jen-chiung. Hsieh's 75,000 troops are a strong enough force to resist the approximately equal number subordinate to the Chengtu headquarters. It is not known whether there is a major arsenal in Yunnan, but, in any case, a rebellion against Peiping could be supported from Burma. There is nothing in Hsieh's record, however, to suggest that he might defy Peiping.

25X6

The Kunming complex thus seems to figure primarily not as a bright possibility for a separatist effort but as another asset for Teng Hsiao-ping.

The Tsinan administration, in a major city of the North China plain (one of China's four principal strategic areas), controls a population of 50,000,000, including 10 percent of the total membership of the Chinese Communist party. Its area of jurisdiction includes Tsingtao, a major port and the principal base of the Chinese Communist navy. The Tsinan headquarters commands about 200,000 troops, with substantial air power. It is uncertain whether there are major arsenals in the area.

The key positions at Tsinan are divided among several persons, and a new team moved into the area since the fall of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, the transfer of Kang Sheng from Tsinan to Peiping, and the acquisition by Teng Hsiao-ping of an important role in assigning personnel to the regional administrations. The three ranking party secretaries in Shantung (all members of the CCP central committee) have worked together since 1955. The current military commander and political officer of the Tsinan headquarters appeared there only in 1957, with the circumstances suggesting the possibility that some of the military personnel of the Tsinan headquarters were involved in an

effort to establish an "independent kingdom" in the area earlier this year.

With Peiping alert since 1954 to the possibility of trouble in Shantung--an alertness perhaps sharpened by developments of this year--there seems little prospect of an effective separatist movement there in the near future. However, the Tsinan administration is interesting in terms of its importance to centers of power in Peiping. Two of the six key figures identified at Tsinan--the third-ranking party secretary and the political officer--have been close to Teng Hsiao-ping. Two others of the six--the two ranking party secretaries--have been close to Tan Chen-lin, now one of Teng's deputies on the party secretariat in Peiping. The military commander in recent years has been close to Peng Te-huai. Thus the Tsinan complex might be added to the centers of power at Chengtu, Kunming, and (to a lesser degree) Wuhan, as an asset primarily for Teng Hsiao-ping.

The most important centers of power below the national level are clearly those--reading from north to south--at Mukden, Peiping, Shanghai-Nanking, and Canton. These are the centers of the four principal strategic areas of China. The military headquarters at each of these points commands greater forces than does any one of the centers of power previously discussed.

The Mukden administration is located in the southern part of the Manchurian plain, containing China's most important complex of heavy industries, and some of its most productive agricultural areas. The area has good railroad facilities, many airfields, and the port of Dairen, second only to Shanghai. Most of the 370,000 troops--believed to be of high quality--in the Northeast are stationed in Liaoning Province, of which Mukden is the capital. The Northeast has the strongest concentration of air power in any military district of China, Mukden has China's most important complex of arsenals, and there are other arsenal complexes at Harbin and Tsitsihar.

The key positions at Mukden, as in each of the four most important centers of power, are divided among several persons. Most of the key figures have worked in the Northeast for several years. The two ranking party secretaries were officials in different Manchurian cities before 1954. The military commander and his deputy may have been associated in the Korean war before being transferred to Mukden. The political officer and his deputy may have been associated before the war. These six key figures have worked together at Mukden for about three years. Whether they have a close personal relationship is not known.

There are certain considerations which would favor the development of an "independent kingdom" at Mukden. The Northeast--which is beyond the Great Wall--has traditionally been distinguished from "China proper," the USSR has long coveted the area, and Soviet assistance would easily be supplied to a separatist regime there. The political leaders at Mukden have been amiably associated with Soviet officials, and the military leaders have been associated with the current leaders of Chinese forces in Korea. In any case, the Northeast has the materiel and the foodstuffs to survive without outside help, and military forces there could probably hold the Northeast for a long time against any combination of forces that could be spared from other areas of China. Finally, a number of political and military figures in the Northeast may be onetime followers of Kao Kang hoping for another "independent kingdom."

However, the USSR would be more likely to help Peiping than to help Mukden in a contest between the two centers. Further, there is nothing to suggest that Mukden leaders could look to support from CPV commanders in Korea. Most importantly, there is no evidence that key figures at Mukden wish to set up against Peiping.

Neither does the Mukden administration present the appearance of an "independent kingdom" in terms of manipulation of a group of protegés by a party leader in Peiping. The first secretary is probably a protegé of Peng Chen of the "organizational" group, the military commander may be close to Peng Te-huai of the "military" group, and the other five key figures at Mukden cannot be aligned with any leader of any one of the conjectured groups in Peiping. In the light of the Northeast's history and the Kao Kang experience, Peiping appears to have taken care to prevent a recurrence of even the first phase of development of an "independent kingdom" in the vital Northeast.

The Canton administration is located in the Canton delta bordering Hong Kong. While the area is much less important than the Manchurian plain, Canton is a major port and naval base and rail center, a commercial center, and a base for operations directed at overseas Chinese. The provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hunan, subordinate militarily to the Canton headquarters, have about 90,000,000 people. The great majority of the 350,000 troops of this headquarters are stationed in Kwangtung, of which Canton is the capital. There is some air power at Canton. While there is no known major arsenal in the area, an alternative source of materiel could be Hong Kong.

As at Mukden, the key positions in the Canton administration are divided among several persons. Unlike Mukden, at Canton the

first secretary, his three ranking deputies, the military commander and his deputies, and the figure suspected to hold the secret police post, have worked together in Canton for many years. This may be true of the political officer and his deputy as well.

Two other factors, in addition to the long association of the key figures at Canton, might be operating in favor of separatist action. Tao Chu, the party secretary and the dominant figure in South China, may conceivably resent his continued assignment to a regional post when others of what appears to be the same caliber have long since been transferred to important posts in Peiping. In addition, South China has serious economic problems, with a chronic food shortage; in recent months, Peiping has reported starvation in Kwangsi, several village uprisings, and some burning of crops. These problems may strain relations between Peiping and the key figures at Canton, most of whom are natives of that region.

The Canton administration does not reflect the influence of any particular group in Peiping. Tao Chu may be a protegé of Tan Cheng, director of the General Political Department and one of Teng Hsiao-ping's deputies on the secretariat, but Tan is not regarded as aligned with Teng. Other key figures at Canton seem to be protegés either of onetime leaders who are now of little importance or of their current superiors at Canton.

The Shanghai-Nanking administration in East China--the party headquarters at Shanghai, the military headquarters and a provincial party headquarters at Nanking--is located in the Yangtze delta. This is a major food-producing area, but is still food-deficient. The area is of strategic importance principally for its transportation centers and for Shanghai, the main commercial city and largest port of China, second only to the Mukden-Anshan area as a center of heavy industry and also (with Nanking) the center of light industry. Most of the 390,000 troops subordinate to the Nanking headquarters--the largest of all regional commands, and with some of the best units--are stationed in the provinces of Kiangsu (of which Nanking is the capital) and Chekiang. There is strong air power in the area.

The key positions in the Shanghai-Nanking administration--which may have been split to prevent an excessive concentration of power--are divided among at least 11 persons: the first secretary of the Shanghai bureau and of the Shanghai municipal committee, at least two and perhaps five provincial secretaries, three other secretaries of the Shanghai municipal committee (one of whom

is probably a police figure), the Shanghai garrison commander, the military commander and deputy commander of the Nanking headquarters, and the political officer of that headquarters and his deputy. All of those key figures have been in East China for several years. The Shanghai leaders, predominantly political figures, have worked together since 1955. Most of the Nanking leaders have worked together for a longer period. Most of the key figures in Nanking as well as in Shanghai had been associated at one time or another with Ko Ching-shih, the Shanghai bureau secretary and now the strongest figure in East China, before Ko took over the Shanghai bureau in 1955.

Shanghai itself lacks the essentials for separatist action. Ko's authority even in that city is by no means undisputed. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that Ko is disaffected. On the contrary, he has been well treated by Peiping and is clearly a coming man, probably destined for a key post in Peiping. Most importantly, even if the relationship among the key figures in Shanghai were close enough for them to make common cause, and Ko were to develop an unrequited ambition, and the lot of them were to be corrupted by the most Westernized of all areas of China (as has probably happened to some officials there in the past)--even if all these factors were operating together, Shanghai simply does not have the military and economic resources to make a stand. The only forces even possibly subordinate to the Shanghai leaders are those of the Shanghai garrison, of no consequence against forces from the Nanking headquarters. There is no known major arsenal in the area. Moreover, Shanghai is totally dependent upon foodstuffs from the outside, and could easily be blockaded and brought down.

Neither does Shanghai present the appearance of an "independent kingdom" in the other sense, that of a common allegiance by key figures to a powerful group in Peiping. The three known party secretaries in Shanghai, the two provincial secretaries believed to be members of the Shanghai bureau, and the Shanghai garrison commander might conceivably all be aligned with the "organizational" group conjectured [redacted] through Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, Teng Hsiao-ping, a protegè of Teng's, and Ko Ching-shih himself (if he is in fact a protegè of Liu or Peng). However, in some cases the picture is cloudy, and two or three of this lot might have been close to Chen I during Chen's days in East China; Chen is thought to belong to an "administrative" group around Chou En-lai. Of the other key figures Shanghai or thought possibly to be connected with the Shanghai bureau, one may belong with the conjectured "police" group and the others cannot be aligned.

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The prospects appear brighter for the Nanking center to make trouble for Peiping. In the first place, whereas Shanghai figures could not take separatist action except in collusion with Nanking military leaders, the Nanking group could get along without Shanghai. Secondly, the Nanking leaders have worked together much longer as a unit. Thirdly, the Nanking command has easier access to agricultural produce in the surrounding countryside. Fourthly, there are two nationally famous military leaders at Nanking, both members of the CCP politburo, one of whom, Marshal Liu Po-cheng, may well be disaffected and is perhaps trying to build a following among the Nanking commanders and the many high-ranking military men now studying in Nanking. Fifthly, both the military commander at Nanking and his deputy may suffer from disappointed ambition, and both may be protegés of a onetime military leader (Chen I) who may also be disappointed in his fortunes. Of the four most important military headquarters, this one seems to have the most factors working toward a challenge to the central leadership. However, no major arsenal is known to be in the area, which may be a critical weakness.

Nanking does not appear to be an "independent kingdom" in the sense of showing the influence of any one group in Peiping. For years, Ko Ching-shih has worked closely with some of the Nanking leaders--the Kiangsu secretary and the political officers of the Nanking headquarters--and probably has some personal influence with them. If Ko can be aligned with the "organizational" group--which is uncertain--then the influence of this group would be reflected to some extent in Nanking. However, as noted above, the Nanking military commander and his deputy are aligned, directly and indirectly, with a figure of the "administrative" group.

The Peiping administration, at the northern rim of the North China plain, is of strategic importance primarily because Peiping is the center of the highly concentrated national government, with the great majority of key figures of the party working and living in that city. Hopei Province also has the commercial center and major port of Tientsin, and in neighboring Shansi the city of Taiyuan is a center of heavy industry. The great majority of the 220,000 troops in these two provinces, believed subordinate to the Peiping headquarters, are in Hopei. There is some air power in the Peiping area, a major arsenal at Taiyuan, and possibly another arsenal at Peiping.

The key positions in the Peiping (i.e., North China, not national) administration are divided among several persons.

These are the two ranking secretaries of the Peiping municipal committee, the military commander of the Peiping headquarters and his deputy, the political officer of that headquarters and his deputy, and possibly the director of the public security department of the city. At least six of these seven have worked together in Peiping since 1949.

Peng Chen, first secretary of the Peiping committee, has been regarded as a key figure in an "organizational" center of power in the party leadership, subject to the caveat that Peng may be at odds with one or more of the other key figures of that conjectured group. In any event, the question of whether Peng has an "independent kingdom" in the Peiping regional administration is the same as the question of whether this administration is responsive to a key figure at the national level. Peng cannot be said at this time to have such a kingdom. Only his deputy secretary seems clearly to be his protegé. The military commander has seemed closer to another party leader and center of power, Peng Te-huai, and the deputy can be aligned only with the commander. The political officers cannot be plausibly aligned with any group. The director of public security, Lo Jui-ching--who may or may not be important in this administration, depending on whether he or Peng Chen as mayor has direct control of public security forces in Peiping--may belong to yet another group, the conjectured "police" figures.

Any attempt at "separatist" action by the Peiping regional administration would of course be inseparable from--in fact, would be a prelude to--an attempt to seize control of the party and government as a whole. Thus the question is not simply one of collusion among officials of a regional administration, but of a life-or-death initiative by one or more of the contending groups in the party leadership against one or more of the others.

At the time of a coup in Peiping, whether or nor military forces were actually used, assurance of physical control of the city of Peiping and the surrounding countryside would be an immense asset. This consideration would make an "independent kingdom" in the Peiping administration--i.e., control of the municipal party committee and municipal government, and of the Peiping military headquarters--a more valuable property than an "independent kingdom" anywhere else in Communist China. At this time, the power in the Peiping administration appears to be divided among figures of at least two, and perhaps all four, of the conjectured groups in the CCP leadership. The most important question, relating to the Peiping administration, may be the state of relations between leaders of the "organizational" and "military" groups. This question, on a national scale, may turn out to be the key to the entire question of the nature of the party leadership which will succeed Mao Tse-tung's personal leadership.

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


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


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